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SUMMARY 
When South African President Thabo Mbeki began doubting that HIV was the cause of 
AIDS in the late 1990s, failed to provide AIDS medication and stalled its introduction, 
openly supported HIV pseudoscientists and doubted HIV statistics, one of the most 
widely reported debates in the country’s history emerged. 
 
When two independent 2008 studies found that the death of approximately 330 000 South 
Africans could have been prevented between 1999 and 2007 if President Mbeki’s HIV 
policy made provision for AIDS medication, the AIDS debate was re-introduced, and it 
was these findings that provided the motivation for this study. The purpose of this study 
was to provide a historical perspective on HIV reporting in the media during Mbeki’s 
presidency in order to answer how the media reflected and reported on his HIV policy, 
and also to provide possible reasons for the way the media reported on the matter. 
 
Research has shown that the government (particularly President Mbeki and his health 
ministers) and AIDS social movement organisations (particularly the Treatment Action 
Campaign [TAC]) were the main actors framing the AIDS epidemic in South Africa. 
Thus, this study examined the media’s HIV trail in reporting on these actors’ responses 
and counter-responses by means of content analysis. Qualitative analysis, in the form of 
questionnaires sent to health journalists who reported on HIV during this period, was 
completed in order to provide the possible reasons for the media’s reporting style. 
During the content analysis it was found that the media reporting was mostly positive 
towards the TAC and mostly critical towards Mbeki and his government, and the results 
of the questionnaires verified this, but also provided reasons why the media were mostly 
critical of Mbeki and his government. One principal reason was that the government’s 
policies on HIV were so blatantly contrary to scientific evidence and medically unethical 
that it was the media’s duty to fulfil their watchdog and surveillance role. 
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OPSOMMING 
Toe die Suid-Afrikaanse president, Thabo Mbeki, in die laat jare negentig begin het om 
die oorsaak van VIGS in twyfel te trek, daarin misluk het om VIGS-medikasie te verskaf 
en produksie daarvan vertraag het, en openlik MIV-pseudowetenskaplikes ondersteun het 
en MIV-statistiek bevraagteken het, het ’n debat met moontlik van dié wydste 
nuusdekking in die geskiedenis van die land posgevat. 
Die VIGS-debat het weer op die voorgrond beland nadat twee onafhanklike studies in 
2008 bevind het sowat 330 000 Suid-Afrikaners se dood kon tussen 1999 en 2007 vermy 
gewees het indien president Mbeki se MIV-beleid voorsiening gemaak het vir die 
verskaffing van VIGS-medikasie. Hierdie bevindinge het die motivering vir die studie 
verskaf. Die doel van hierdie studie was om ’n historiese perspektief van die 
mediadekking van MIV tydens Mbeki se presidentskap te verskaf om sodoende vas te 
stel hoe die media die debat oor Mbeki se MIV-beleid weerspieël het, maar ook om die 
redes te bepaal vir die manier waarop die media oor die kwessie berig het. 
Navorsing het getoon die regering (spesifiek president Mbeki en sy gesondheids-
ministers) en aktivistegroepe (spesifiek die Treatment Action Campaign [TAC]) was die 
hoofkarakters betrokke by die fokussering van die VIGS-epidemie in Suid-Afrika. Dus 
het hierdie studie probeer om die media se MIV-spore met betrekking tot beriggewing 
oor hierdie akteurs se stellings en reaksies deur middel van inhoudanalise te bestudeer. 
Kwalitatiewe analise in die vorm van vraelyste wat aan gesondheidsjoernaliste gestuur is 
wat in hierdie tydperk beriggewing oor MIV gedoen het, is gebruik om moontlike redes 
te verskaf vir die manier van beriggewing. 
Tydens die inhoudanalise is bevind dat mediadekking meestal positief teenoor die TAC 
was en meestal negatief teenoor Mbeki en sy regering. Die resultate van die vraelyste het 
dít bevestig, en redes verskaf waarom die media meestal krities was teenoor Mbeki en sy 
regering. Een van die vernaamste redes was dat die regering se beleidsrigtings met 
betrekking tot MIV so blatant teen wetenskaplike bewyse gekant was en boonop medies 
oneties was, dat dit juis die media se plig was om die rol van waghond te speel. 
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LIST OF ORGANISATIONS, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AIDS  Acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
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FDA  Food and Drug Administration in the United States 
HAART Highly active antiretroviral treatment 
MDDA Media Development and Diversity Agency 
MTCT Mother-to-child transmission 
MRC  Medical Research Council 
NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council 
PEP  Post-exposure prophylaxis 
SANAC South African National AIDS Council 
TAC  Treatment Action Campaign 
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS 
WHO World Health Organization 
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Politics and HIV and AIDS in South Africa: an analysis of 
media reporting during the presidency of Thabo Mbeki (1999-
2008) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The motivation for this study 
 
The deadly delusions of the President and his Minister of Health infected a country and 
paralysed its response to the worst health epidemic of our time (Geffen, 2010: 2). 
 
In South Africa, over two and a half million people have already died of HIV, most of 
them during the time of Thabo Mbeki’s Presidency (Geffen, 2010: 1). During this time, 
the United Nations released the following statistics: 
 
Africa remains the global epicentre of the AIDS pandemic. South Africa’s AIDS 
epidemic – one of the worst in the world – shows no evidence of a decline. Based 
on its extensive antenatal clinic surveillance system, as well as national surveys 
with HIV testing and mortality data from its civil registration system, an 
estimated 5,5 million people were living with HIV in 2005. An estimated 18,8% 
of adults (15-49 years) were living with HIV in 2005. Almost one in three 
pregnant women attending public antenatal clinics were living with HIV in 2004 
and trends over time show a gradual increase in HIV prevalence (UNAIDS, 2006: 
8-9). 
 
Although South Africa was labelled the “global epicentre of the AIDS pandemic”, Mbeki 
and his Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, were accused of the following: 
obstructing policies aimed at providing life-saving medicines to people with HIV or at 
risk of contracting it, promoting confusion and doubt about the prevention and treatment 
of HIV, and protecting and promoting people who marketed untested remedies (Geffen,  
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2010: 1). Mbeki gave an interview to Time magazine in 2000 and, when the journalist 
asked him, “Are you prepared to acknowledge that there is a link between HIV and 
AIDS?”, he answered: 
 
No, I am saying that you cannot attribute immune deficiency solely and 
exclusively to a virus. There may very well be a virus. But TB, for example, 
destroys the immune system and at a certain point if you have TB you will test 
HIV positive because the immune system is fighting the TB which is destroying 
it. Then you will go further to say TB is an opportunistic disease of Aids whereas 
in fact TB is the thing that destroyed the immune system in the first place. But if 
you come to the conclusion that the only thing that destroys immune systems is 
HIV then your only response is to give them antiretroviral drugs. There’s no point 
in attending to this TB business because that’s just an opportunistic disease. If the 
scientists ... say this virus is part of the variety of things from which people 
acquire immune deficiency, I have no problem with that (The road ahead: an 
interview with South African President Thabo Mbeki, 2000). 
 
In 2007, Nathan Geffen, director of research and communication for the Treatment 
Action Campaign (TAC), stated that perhaps “hundreds of thousands of lives” were lost 
because of Mbeki and his Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang’s sympathy for 
AIDS denialism (Geffen, 2007: 4). In 2008, two independent studies calculated the 
number of lives lost as a result of the South African government acting as a major 
obstacle to the provision of medication to patients with AIDS (Chigwedere et al., 2008: 
410; Nattrass, 2008). Both these studies found that, between 1999 and 2007, 
approximately 340 000 deaths could have been prevented through the provision of AIDS 
medication.  
 
However, it could have been different. Geffen (2010: 2) points out that, as far as public 
record shows, Mbeki “was not always a denialist”. Mbeki, then deputy president of South 
Africa, said the following on behalf of President Mandela in October 1998: 
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HIV/AIDS is among us. It is real. It is spreading. We can only win against 
HIV/AIDS if we join hands to save our nation. For too long we have closed our 
eyes as a nation, hoping the truth was not real. For many years, we have allowed 
the H-I-Virus to spread, and at a rate in our country which is one of the fastest in 
the world. Every single day a further 1 500 people in South Africa get infected. 
To date, more than three million people have been infected (Geffen, 2010: 2).  
 
The main motivation for this study, therefore, stems from findings that Mbeki and his 
government’s HIV policy caused the death of thousands of people. How the media 
reported on this international health and human rights matter is thus investigated. 
 
1.2 The aim of this study  
 
The observation outlined above determines that the primary aim of this study is to assess 
the South African media’s reportage on HIV during Mbeki’s Presidency (1999 to 2008), 
as well as to follow the government’s trail of dissidence during this period.  
 
The purpose of this research is to study media content to obtain a historical perspective 
on how, in the words of the individual reporters interviewed here, some of the media 
experienced and reported on the subject of HIV in order to discover how the media felt 
about and reported on Mbeki’s HIV policy. 
 
1.3 An indication of how the research idea evolved from preliminary 
reading 
 
Galloway’s research followed HIV and AIDS journalism in South Africa in 1999 and 
2000 (Galloway, 2001). Malan’s research followed HIV and AIDS journalism up until 
2002 (Malan, 2003). Both of these researchers focused on controversial events or 
incidents surrounding HIV and AIDS during Mbeki’s Presidency and how the media 
reported on them. Galloway found that there was much room for improvement for 
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journalists and made suggestions on how to bridge the gap between the current practice 
and a more ideal approach (Galloway, 2001). Malan’s thesis examined the politics 
surrounding the science of AIDS and how the news media covered the process (Malan, 
2003).  
 
These research findings encouraged the researcher to follow the further trail of HIV 
journalism up until 2008, when Mbeki stepped down from the Presidency, and also to 
research how the media reflected the controversy and felt about Mbeki’s HIV policy.  
 
1.4 Introducing the research design for the study 
 
1.4.1 The overarching paradigm of this research 
 
The dominant perspective expressed in this study is that the media have a surveillance 
function upon which the public relies to expose violations of the moral and social order. 
According to Fourie (2001: 276), the media have a surveillance role to act as a watchdog, 
especially in developing countries (like South Africa), and this causes the media to be 
unpopular with the government. 
 
The South African media and the functions of the press are dealt with in the next chapter. 
It therefore is sufficient to mention at this point that although research shows (Fourie, 
2003; Bolognesi, 2006) that the South African AIDS context demands a socially 
responsible role to be played by journalists, it also provides unique challenges for health 
reporters to offer a fair yet socially responsible window on the Mbeki government’s HIV 
policies. 
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1.4.2 Overview of the methodology  
 
The research method employed in this study was an analysis of media content in order to 
answer the question: How did the media report on Mbeki’s HIV policy? Furthermore, 
what were the main characteristics of their reporting during the period under review? 
 
The primary method of data collection was content analysis: a structured study of media 
reports on HIV and AIDS from 1999 to 2008, clustering around certain events and 
incidents. Parker, Dalrymple and Durden (1998) state that articles on HIV and AIDS 
usually focus on events, statistics, legal aspects, funding and treatment. The researcher 
therefore chose key events or incidents that sparked a lot of media reporting during that 
time. These “key events” will be dealt with in Chapter 2, where the researcher will draw a 
chronology of Mbeki and his government’s dissidence and discuss their lack of providing 
a proper AIDS treatment programme during Mbeki’s Presidency. 
 
After completion of the content analysis, a qualitative analysis in the form of 
questionnaires sent to health journalists who reported on HIV and AIDS during this 
period was undertaken. 
 
1.5 Overview of the remainder of the thesis 
 
The following chapter consists of a detailed literature review of the issues pertinent to 
this research. The review further contextualises the research problem and provides a 
theoretical framework. 
 
A brief chronology of all the events indicating the HIV dissidence of President Mbeki 
and his government provides a useful foundation for understanding the government’s 
responses to the epidemic, as well as the media coverage during this period. 
 
An overview of South African AIDS statistics, as well as a closer look at the two 
independent studies that were a motivation for this study, is then given. 
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A definition of basic media theories and the identification of gatekeeping and framing 
also provide a framework for the content analysis of the media coverage during Mbeki’s 
Presidency. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the understanding of HIV and AIDS by the South African public by 
looking at the various factors influencing this understanding. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the South African government’s courtship of pseudoscience by 
looking at how Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang and Mbeki supported 
pseudoscience, such as in the Virodene affair, and pseudoscientists like Matthias Rath 
and Tine van der Maas. The chapter investigates the consequences of this support and the 
direct consequences of state support for pseudoscience. 
 
In Chapter 5 the media coverage of the AIDS crisis from 1999 to 2008 is investigated, 
and conclusions are drawn. This is followed by a discussion of the qualitative 
questionnaire sent out to health journalists who reported on the pandemic during the 
period under discussion. 
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2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Following the trail of dissidence and government HIV policy 
“Access to appropriate public health practice is often determined by a small number of 
political leaders. In the case of South Africa, many lives were lost because of a failure to 
accept the use of available ARVs to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS in a timely manner” 
(Chigwedere et al., 2008: 414). 
 
This study is based on the premise that the Mbeki government did not do everything in its 
power to address the AIDS crisis, as stated by Chigwedere et al. (2008). According to a 
study from 2004, three events especially show that Mbeki’s position on AIDS influenced 
the course of the AIDS policy process: 
1. By saying that ARVs were toxic, the policy implementation was delayed until 
2001, when the High Court ordered the provision of treatment only at pilot sites. 
2. Mbeki questioned the cause of AIDS and argued that if poverty was the main 
problem, ARV medication was not the answer. 
3. Mbeki questioned whether HIV was the reason for the most deaths in South 
Africa (Salcedo, 2004: 37-38). 
The researcher feels it necessary to present a brief chronology of all the events indicating 
the HIV and AIDS dissidence of Mbeki and the South African government and their lack 
of providing a proper AIDS treatment programme (or delay thereof) during his 
Presidency. This could be useful in understanding the government’s responses to the 
epidemic. 
 
1997: When Mbeki was still deputy president, he promoted “research” on the use of the 
toxic “drug” Virodene that “contained an industrial solvent which caused severe liver 
damage’’ before any scientific peer review of the drug was undertaken (Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2007: 7; Palitza et al., 2010: xii). Mbeki unleashed a political storm when he 
played a prominent role in attempts to fast-track the registration of this widely 
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condemned “cure for AIDS” that was “found” by a team of Pretoria University 
researchers (Malan, 2003: 63). 
 
1998: In late 1998, then Health Minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma announced that all 
projects providing AZT, a type of antiretroviral drug, to HIV-positive pregnant women 
would be discontinued and that she and the nine provincial health MECs would instead 
be concentrating on prevention, firstly insisting that the government could not afford to 
finance programmes (Nattrass, 2007: 45) and, secondly dismissing a study “that 
demonstrated that short courses of various anti-aids drugs, including AZT, were viable 
options for the reduction of MTCT” (Malan, 2003: 67).   
 
On 1 December the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) was formed, in response to 
Dlamini-Zuma’s decision to end MTCTP pilot projects, which “was the final straw for 
many AIDS activists” (Nattrass, 2007: 45). According to Nattrass (2007: 45), the TAC 
was formed to “campaign for greater access to treatment for all South Africans, by 
raising public awareness and understanding about issues surrounding the availability, 
affordability and use of HIV treatments”. 
 
1999: Mbeki became president of South Africa in May 1999 (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007: 
7). He then appointed Manto Tshabalala-Msimang as minister of health, replacing 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, which meant that “government started to take an even 
stronger stance against ARVs (Palitza et al., 2010: xiii). Mbeki withdrew government 
support from Gauteng clinics that had begun using “zidovudine (ZDV or AZT)” for the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) (Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 1). In 
October he addressed the National Council of Provinces about the high incidence of rape. 
When the TAC called for AZT to be made available to pregnant women he vetoed the 
idea, saying “there exists a large volume of scientific literature alleging that, among other 
things, the toxicity of this drug is such that it is in fact a danger to health” (Geffen, 2010: 
40).  
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2000: This was an eventful year in terms of dissident activities. In January there were 
reports that Mbeki was in contact with David Rasnick, a chemist and AIDS dissident who 
claimed that HIV was not infectious. Rasnick said that the president personally 
telephoned him to tell him that he was planning a “public airing of issues such as whether 
AIDS is sexually transmitted and whether HIV causes AIDS” (Schoofs, 2000, as cited by 
Bolognesi, 2006: 25). In February, Tshabalala-Msimang revealed that she had rejected 
two reports by the Medical Control Council (MCC) that concluded that the benefits of 
AZT outweighed the risks (Nattrass, 2007: 187). In March Mbeki publicly questioned 
whether or not HIV causes AIDS (Bolognesi, 2006: 25) and, as a result, he convened a 
Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel to “shed light on the causes of AIDS” (Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2007: 7). The panel “comprised scientists who believed in the causal link 
between HIV and AIDS as well as the so-called ‘dissidents’ who did not” (Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2007: 7). In April, Mbeki sent a five-page hand-addressed letter to several First 
World state leaders describing the AIDS epidemic as a “uniquely African catastrophe” 
(Fox, 2000, as cited by Malan, 2003: 71).  
 
Mbeki (2000) stated: 
 
Whereas in the West HIV-AIDS is said to be largely homosexually transmitted, it 
is reported that in Africa, including our country, it is transmitted heterosexually. 
Accordingly, as Africans, we have to deal with this uniquely African catastrophe. 
It is obvious that whatever lessons we have to and may draw from the West about 
the grave issue of HIV-AIDS, a simple superimposition of Western experience on 
African reality would be absurd and illogical.  
 
On 30 March the Health Minister announced that Nevirapine would not be offered in 
public hospitals until she had seen further research (Nattrass, 2007: 188). On 3 April, 
Mbeki wrote a letter to world leaders (Kofi Annan, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair) asking 
them “to revisit the issue of AIDS in Africa and defending the AIDS denialists” 
(Nattrass, 2007: 188). 
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In July 2000, Tshabalala-Msimang rejected an offer from Boehringer Ingelheim to 
provide Nevirapine free of charge for government’s MTCTP programmes for a period of 
five years (Nattrass, 2007: 188). On 9 July, during the 13th International AIDS 
Conference in Durban, Mbeki referred in his opening address to poverty, and not to HIV, 
“as the root cause of the growing AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa” (Collins, 2000, 
as cited by Malan, 2003: 76). During the same conference, ground-breaking results were 
announced for studies on Nevirapine, a drug that combats MTCT transmission at a much 
cheaper rate than AZT, and the manufacturer – Boehringer and Ingelheim – offered a free 
five-year supply. Once again the government rejected anti-AIDS drugs (Malan, 2003: 
77).  In September, Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang circulated a chapter from a 
conspiracy book, Beyond the pale horse, by William Cooper, who claimed that AIDS was 
a conspiracy designed to kill Africans (transcript of John Robbie on Talk Radio 702, as 
cited by Malan, 2003: 77).  
 
On 21 September, Mbeki told parliament that government policy was based on the thesis 
that HIV causes AIDS, but he also said that “a virus cannot cause a syndrome” and 
warned members of parliament about taking ARVs (Nattrass, 2007: 189). 
 
2001: On 24 April, Mbeki said on television that he would not have an HIV test because 
then he would be confirming a particular paradigm (Nattrass, 2007: 190). In August he 
sparked off a debate over AIDS death statistics when he used 1995 World Health 
Organization (WHO) statistics to claim that, because only 2,2% of recorded deaths are 
listed as caused by AIDS, social and health policy priorities should be re-evaluated 
(Nattrass, 2007: 190). In September Mbeki dismissed the results of a Medical Research 
Council (MRC) report that found HIV to be the single biggest cause of death in South 
Africa (Fine, 2001, as cited by Malan, 2003: 79). The TAC took court action to force the 
government to provide Nevirapine to HIV-positive pregnant women, but the state argued 
that it already had 18 pilot sites and – once again – questioned the safety of the drug 
(Malan, 2003: 80). 
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2002: In July the Constitutional Court ordered the state to make Nevirapine available, 
and when the announcement was made at the 14th International AIDS conference, 
Tshabalala-Msimang said to a health correspondent “... the High Court has decided the 
constitution says I must give my people a drug that isn’t approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration in the United States (FDA). I must poison my people” (Garret, 2002, as 
cited by Malan, 2003: 82).  
 
At the same conference Mbeki obstructed grants from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria for AIDS treatment (Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 237). In 
October the Cabinet announced its plan to implement MTCTP, but despite the statement 
the delay of MTCTP continued (Nattrass, 2004: 55, as cited by Salcedo, 2004: 35). 
In November, AIDS denialist Roberto Giraldo addressed the Department of Health on 
nutrition as a solution to AIDS (Nattrass, 2007: 191). 
 
2003: In January, Tshabalala-Msimang invited Giraldo to address a meeting of Southern 
African Development Community Health Ministers (Nattrass, 2007: 191). On 14 
February Mbeki mentioned AIDS only once in his State of the Nation Address, after he 
identified tuberculosis as the biggest killer in South Africa (Mbeki sê min oor vigs, Zim, 
2003: 1). The government delayed a proper AIDS treatment programme and, also in 
February, Tshabalala-Msimang refused to sign the agreement on AIDS treatment 
negotiated by the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
(Salcedo, 2004: 36). The consequence of public pressure was a statement from 
government in August that they support ARV treatment, but instead of immediate 
provision they asked the Department of Health to develop a programme (Nattrass, 2004: 
55, as cited by Salcedo, 2004: 35). The national PMTCT programme started late in 
comparison to Botswana, where it had already started in 1999 (Chigwedere et al., 2008: 
2). 
 
On 18 March the Health Minister praised Giraldo and advocated nutritional interventions 
for people with AIDS at a briefing to the parliamentary Health Portfolio Committee 
(Nattrass, 2007: 192). On 8 April Tshabalala-Msimang launched a racial attack on TAC 
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leader Mark Heywood at a welcome meeting for Richard Feachem, executive director of 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Nattrass, 2007: 192). On 25 
September Mbeki told the Washington Post: “Personally, I don’t know anyone who has 
died of AIDS. I really honestly don’t” (Mbeki’s AIDS comments defended, 2003). 
 
2004: In Mbeki’s State of the Nation Address he mentioned AIDS only once and said 
nothing of the rollout of antiretroviral drugs (Hartley, 2004: 9). The national ARV 
programme started in South Africa late in comparison to that launched by President 
Mogae of Botswana on 1 December 2001, which meant that there was already 85% ARV 
coverage by 2005 (Chigwedere et al., 2008: 2). Treatment guidelines were only issued in 
September (Palitza et al., 2010: xiii). 
 
2005: In his State of the Nation Address, Mbeki mentioned South Africa’s 
“comprehensive” AIDS programmes and the “greater vigour” with which the government 
was fighting AIDS, without acknowledging that ARV treatment targets had not been met 
(SA ‘stepping up’ AIDS fight, 2005). The national ARV programme was still progressing 
slowly and was only rolled out in March (Palitza et al., 2010: xiii). On 5 May, then 
Minister of Health Tshabalala-Msimang stated that it did not work just to “dish out” 
ARVs because they were available, but that raw garlic and the skin of a lemon would not 
only give you a beautiful face and skin – it would also protect you from disease (CNN, 
2005, as cited by Bolognesi, 2006: 30).  
 
In September, two AIDS denialists (Sam Mhlongo and David Rasnick) were invited to 
address the National Health Council to present the results of their unofficial clinical 
“trial” (Nattrass, 2007: 194). 
 
2006: Tshabalala-Msimang promoted vitamins as an alternative to ARV at the 
International AIDS conference in Toronto (Chigwedere et al., 2008: 2). Geffen, who also 
attended the conference on behalf of the TAC, stated that the South African government’s 
stand “featured garlic, lemons and African potatoes – the minister’s idea for treatment for 
AIDS”, without any sign of ARVs (Geffen, 2010: 72). In late 2006, Tshabalala-Msimang 
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was hospitalised for a liver transplant and her deputy, Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge, 
together with Deputy President Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, took on the government’s 
HIV policy and made a major attempt to bring the South African National AIDS Council 
(SANAC) back to life (Palitza et al., 2010: xiii). 
 
From 2006 the AIDS policy started to change, as Nattrass (2008: 157) stated recently: 
“AIDS policy improved after the Deputy President was given responsibility for 
coordinating AIDS policy in 2006”. In November Madlala-Routledge broke official 
orders and spoke to an international publication, blaming AIDS policy failures on 
“denialism at the highest level” (Bevan, 2006). 
 
2007: In March the government launched its progressive HIV and AIDS and STI 
Strategic Plan for South Africa, “indicating an important shift in its health policy” 
(Palitza et al., 2010: xiv). 
 
2008: The new era of HIV policy did not last long because Madlala-Routledge was fired 
and Tshabalala-Msimang was reinstated. However, Tshabalala-Msimang lost her post to 
Barbara Hogan when Kgalema Motlanthe was appointed to finish Mbeki’s presidential 
term (Palitza et al., 2010: xiv). 
 
The above overview gives an idea of how a head of state turned his back on science and 
turned to dissident views, even though it caused an international public outcry. 
 
2.2 South African HIV statistics 
According to estimates released by the United Nations in 2006, “Africa remains the 
global epicentre of the AIDS pandemic”, and South Africa’s AIDS epidemic, “one of the 
worst in the world”, was not showing any evidence of decline (UNAIDS, 2006: 6). In 
2005, 5,5 million people were living with HIV in South Africa. A total of 18,8% of adults 
between the ages of 15 and 49 and almost one in three pregnant women attending 
antenatal clinics had the virus (UNAIDS, 2006: 7).  
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In February 2005, Statistics South Africa released the report, Mortality and Causes of 
Death in South Africa from 1997 to 2003. The results of the report were based on a 
certain number of death certificates (Bolognesi, 2006: 12). An analysis of the report by 
the MRC showed that the greatest increases in deaths were in the age groups 0 to 4 and 
25 to 49 years (Bolognesi, 2006: 13). According to the MRC, “HIV caused the deaths of 
53 185 men aged 15 to 59 years, 59 445 women aged 15-59 years and 40 727 children 
under 5 years old in the year 2000-2001” (Noble et al., 2005, as cited by Bolognesi, 
2006: 13). This means that 74% of deaths among children under five during this period 
were AIDS related (Medical News Today, 2005, as cited by Bolognesi, 2006: 13). 
 
According to the United Nations’ 2008 report, sub-Saharan Africa still remains most 
heavily affected by HIV, “accounting for 67% of all people living with HIV and for 72% 
of AIDS deaths in 2007”, even though HIV prevalence has stabilised (UNAIDS, 2008: 
7). According to the report, the number of children younger than 15 years living with 
HIV increased from 1,6 million in 2001 to 2,0 million in 2007. Ninety percent of these 
children live in sub-Saharan Africa. The rate of annual AIDS deaths among children has 
also begun to fall, however, due to treatment scale-up and PMTCT. 
 
According to UNAIDS and WHO only 38% of those in need of ART were on treatment 
(National Communication Survey, 2009). According to the 2009 National 
Communication Survey, an estimated 50% of those in need of ART were being treated at 
the end of 2009. 
 
A statistical report released by Statistics South Africa in 2011 showed that 5,26 million 
people were living with HIV in 2010, and the number increased to 5,38 million people in 
2011 (Statistics South Africa, 2011: 5). The report also showed that the number of new 
HIV infections among the population aged 15 years and older was estimated at 316 900 
for 2011, while new HIV infections among children (aged 0 to 14 years) was estimated at 
63 600 (Statistics South Africa, 2011: 2). In 2010, 263 368 (44,4 %) AIDS deaths were 
calculated in South Africa, while there were 257 910 (43,6%) AIDS deaths in 2011 
(Statistics South Africa, 2011: 7). 
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In 2009, 839 519 adults and 87 439 children were receiving ART, while research in 2010 
showed that 1058 399 adults and 105 123 children were receiving ART (Statistics South 
Africa, 2011: 4). 
 
The results from these various reports clearly indicate that: 
• The death of children is slowly decreasing due to the rollout of PMTCT since 
2003. 
• ART treatment is increasing. 
• Although Mbeki dismissed the results, HIV is the single biggest cause of death in 
South Africa. 
 
2.3 Lives lost 
Two independent studies calculated the South African lives lost due to the delayed rollout 
of highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) and PMTCT. Although the studies used 
different methods, the estimation of lives lost due to the lack of treatment are very 
similar. 
 
2.3.1 Harvard School of Public Health Study 
By using UNAIDS estimates of deaths to determine the number of people who were 
eligible but did not receive treatment, Chigwedere and colleagues from the Harvard 
School of Public Health determined that more than 330 000 lives, or approximately 2,2 
million person-years, had been lost because of  the delayed rollout of ARV treatment 
(Chigwedere et al., 2008: 410).  By not implementing PMTCT, 35 000 babies were born 
with HIV, resulting in 1,6 million person-years lost. As a result, the total lost benefits of 
ARVs are at least 3,8 million person-years (Chigwedere et al., 2008: 410). 
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2.3.2 University of Cape Town Study 
Nicoli Nattrass, founder of the AIDS and Society Research Unit at the University of Cape 
Town, analysed what would have happened if PMTCT had been rolled out in 1998 
instead of in 2001, and if HAART had been rolled out throughout South Africa at the 
same rate as in the Western Cape Province (from 10% in 2000 to 65% in 2007). The 
Western Cape rollout was in defiance of national policy on ARVs (Nattrass, 2008: 157; 
Geffen, 2010). Nattrass found that about 171 000 HIV infections and 343 000 deaths 
could have been prevented between 1999 and 2007 (Nattrass, 2008: 157). 
 
2.3.3 Implications 
Chigwedere and Essex of the Harvard School of Public Health did another study recently 
and found the following key implications of the relationship between AIDS denialism 
and public health practice, as in the case of South Africa: 
1. Mbeki and his government’s denialism infiltrated South Africa’s public health 
practice with tragic consequences: “Mbeki withdrew support from clinics that 
started using ARVs, restricted use of donated ARVs, obstructed Global Fund 
to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria grants, and generally delayed 
implementing a national ARV programme” (Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 
243). 
2. Mbeki’s denialism and policies led to more than 330 000 deaths and this 
certainly demands accountability. 
3. AIDS denialists are dangerous to the general population because citizens are 
persuaded to follow risky behaviour and use ineffective alternative remedies 
(Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 243). 
Since these lives lost are no longer just an estimation, there has been an international 
public outcry and calls for Mbeki to be held accountable. Seth Kalichman of the 
University of Connecticut compared AIDS denialists to Holocaust deniers, and Edwin 
Cameron states in his book, Witness to AIDS, that letting AIDS patients die without 
medication is equivalent to those who kept quiet about the evils of Nazi Germany and 
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apartheid South Africa (Cameron, 2005, as cited by Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 243; 
Kalichman, 2009, as cited by Chigwedere & Essex, 2010: 243). Zackie Achmat, leader of 
the TAC, has called for Mbeki to be summoned before a judicial enquiry like the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (Plaut, 2008). 
 
Defiant medical practitioners are disciplined by medical societies and deregistered by 
states, but accountability seems absent in public and global health (Chigwedere & Essex, 
2010: 244). Thus, AIDS denialism in South Africa has exposed the deficiencies of public 
health, and the need for accountability and public health reform (Chigwedere & Essex, 
2010: 244). 
 
2.4 Mbeki and his government’s communication on HIV: South African 
research 
The researcher examined a range of local research that was done on the political 
communication from the Mbeki government regarding HIV. 
 
A study (Telling the story of the century – How are journalists coping with reporting on 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa?) published by Galloway in 2001 presents a bird’s eye view of 
the state of South African journalism on the AIDS epidemic. Although the focus of the 
study was how the journalist portrayed the message, the author also found the following 
“mixed messages” from the government: 
 
At the height of the events, health care providers were reporting that some 
patients were returning to high-risk behaviours, including breastfeeding and 
unsafe sex, because they were confused by the government’s message on whether 
AIDS was infectious or not (Galloway, 2001: 58). 
 
Galloway also believes that the biggest HIV story of 2000 was probably the 
Mbeki/dissidents controversy, because: 
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When a president of a country facing an AIDS crisis of unprecedented proportions 
appears to side with a controversial minority scientific viewpoint that has been 
discredited and ignored by the majority scientific community for years, the press 
will have a field day (Galloway: 2001: 56). 
 
In a study published in 2003, Fourie focused on HIV journalism in South Africa and 
urged South African journalists to be more “sensitive” and to try to inform but also 
empower readers. Fourie mentioned that, at that time, the government was “still debating 
whether HIV causes AIDS” and wondered what to do or waited for the court to tell them 
what to do regarding HIV and AIDS (Fourie, 2003: 46). 
 
In another study in 2003, Malan looked at the scientific politics of HIV and AIDS from a 
media perspective – from the discovery of HIV up until Mbeki’s controversial 
contentions (Malan, 2003). Malan found that the South African media were completely 
unprepared for the dissident debate and that the government often branded criticism as 
racist and unpatriotic, with journalists suffering regular intimidation by government. 
 
A 2006 thesis, The media management of Nevirapine: content, causes and consequences, 
briefly looked at a chronological overview of Mbeki’s AIDS dissidence and found “how 
a lack of appropriate leadership in the midst of a national health crisis has opened the 
stage to many players who pontificate on the drug for political gain. These players, 
among them AIDS dissidents, are intent on setting their own agendas and operate from a 
poor scientific knowledge base, creating confusion amongst the community…” 
(Bolognesi, 2006: 24).  
 
In 2004 the Wits University Journalism Programme and the Perinatal HIV Research Unit 
undertook a joint study on the factors influencing the shaping of the representation of 
conflict around HIV policy in the South African media. Focusing on the media, the study 
found that “there is an absence of a broad analytical role played by the press” and that it 
has failed as a “pro-active, interlocutor in the conflict” (Finlay, 2004: 29). The study also 
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found that government’s communication patterns are frequently out of step with the 
information needs of journalists. 
 
A 2007 study titled “Media, social movements and the state: competing images of 
HIV/AIDS in South Africa” found that the media focused primarily on the conflicts 
surrounding HIV and AIDS and did not reflect the urgency of the crisis. It was also found 
that Mbeki’s framing of the AIDS crisis had a censoring effect on the media (Jacobs & 
Johnson, 2007: 1). 
 
 
2.5 The media 
 
2.5.1 The power of the media 
De Beer (2003: 128) explains the important role that mass media play in modern day 
societies: 
 
Mass media plays a vital role in modernist societies and in the surrounding global 
culture, which makes it a backbone of persuasive cultural environment – the 
media has influence. The influence is greater than before, because ‘media reality’ 
has to a large extent taken over from ‘conceptual reality’. 
 
According to Bolognesi (2006: 31), the media have a lot of influence and are very 
important within the context of the management of issues “which relate to basic human 
rights in developing countries such as South Africa”. Bolognesi further argues “that 
nothing should stand in the way of the most basic of all human rights, the right to good 
health”, and therefore the South African media carry a particular responsibility in this 
regard. Lynn Dalrymple, HIV and AIDS communication researcher (cited by Galloway, 
2000: 30), states: 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
The general population in South Africa has grown up under a system that ensured 
that they would be poorly educated, particularly in scientific matters ... Many 
people do not have the skills to distinguish between sensationalist reporting and 
the factual matter ... so that everything that is read is taken as fact. 
 
McQuail’s functionalist theory on media and society states that “the more an audience is 
reliant on the mass media for information and the more a society is in a state of crisis or 
instability, then the more power the media are more likely to have (or be credited with)” 
(2000: 79). The lack of public knowledge of HIV, the lack of adequate science education 
at school and the enormity of the AIDS epidemic at the time of Mbeki’s Presidency 
increase both the responsibility of the media in reporting on HIV and the reliance of the 
public on this reporting. However, the responsibility does not lie solely with the media, 
but also with the government and how it communicated about HIV during this time.  
 
Having established the big influence of the mass media, a brief overview of the various 
theories of the press, the roles of the media and the news values they create is useful in 
providing a theoretical framework for a content analysis of the media as reflected in their 
reporting on HIV. 
 
2.5.2 The function of the media: press theories and the roles of the 
media 
According to Fourie (2001: 265), the bottom line of functionalism is that the media in 
society form a powerful socialisation instrument that should function towards integration, 
harmony and cohesion, whether it is through the information, education and/or 
entertainment they provide. However, Fourie (2001: 265) argues that many functionalist 
models are simplistic and do not provide for other manifestations of the media, especially 
when it comes to the political functions of the media. 
 
Some of the main objections to functionalism are that it often: 
• Tends to overlook the fact that the media do not necessarily have the same 
functions for the same people or groups in society. 
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• Fails to adequately account for social change and transformation. This means that 
these media functions might be dysfunctional in societies that are in a process of 
change, development and transformation, which is applicable in South Africa’s 
case. 
• Tends not to acknowledge the importance of the social, political and cultural 
context (O’Sullivan et al., 1994: 95-96). 
Nevertheless, McQuail (2000: 79-80) argues that functionalist models provide us with 
“basic ideas” about the role of the media in society. According to Fourie (2001: 269), 
recently revised theories of the press place media tasks in two categories: the normative 
and sociological category which deal with the subjective viewpoints of elite players (such 
as cabinet ministers and government officials) and the objective category within society 
respectively. Fourie urges that we should distinguish between the “ideal” role of the 
media in society (openly normative theories), and the “real” role of the media 
(sociological) in society. 
 
Fourie (2001: 270-275) draws from Roelofse (1996) and McQuail (1987) to provide an 
overview of the normative theories (ideal role): 
• The authoritarian theory assumes that the media should do nothing to undermine 
vested power and interests; they should be subordinate to vested power and 
authority. This means that censorship is justified and that editorial attacks on 
government should be regarded as criminal offences. 
• The libertarian theory claims that people are rational beings capable of 
distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and between good and evil. The 
media should be free from external censorship, publication and distribution 
should be accessible to any individual or group, editorial attacks on government 
should not be punishable and there should be no coercion to publish anything. 
• The social responsibility theory is based on the assumption that the media have an 
important function in society, especially with regard to supporting democratic 
political principals. This entails that the media are under obligation to fulfil their 
social functions and should meet certain standards. 
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• The Soviet communist press theory has no profit motive. The media should act in 
the interests of and be controlled by the working class and should not be under 
private control. 
• The development theory is based on developing countries that advocate the 
positive use of the media to promote national development. 
• The democratic-participant theory is primarily a reaction to the trends towards 
commercialisation and monopoly formation in privately controlled mass media 
and towards centralisation and bureaucratisation in public broadcasting. This 
means that the media and the content of messages should not be influenced by 
political or bureaucratic control. In general, social needs are neglected. 
According to Fourie (2001: 275-276) the above normative theories were revised and it is 
proposed that, instead of formalising specific theories to classify the role of the media 
system, one should rather classify the kind of arguments about media roles or functions 
within the framework of a specific paradigm: 
• The liberal-individualist paradigm, where the role of the media is to contribute to 
and uphold democracy. This means the government should have a minimal role in 
the media. 
• The social responsibility paradigm, where the role of the media is to contribute to 
the upliftment of society and its citizens. 
• The critical paradigm, where the media should question prevailing and oppressive 
ideologies. 
• The administrative paradigm, where the emphasis is on the efficient transmission 
of reliable information to all sectors of the public. 
• The cultural negotiation paradigm, where the emphasis is on the rights of 
subcultures and a real sense of community. 
Fourie (2001: 276) states that these paradigms lay the foundation for the roles the media 
can play: 
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• Collaborative: a role the media play when a nation-state is young and insecure. In 
other words, the media collaborate in the development of ideals, nation building 
and national interest. This is the role the SA government wanted the media to 
play. 
• Surveillance: the media play an adverse role, act as a watchdog and agenda-setter. 
The media expose violations of the moral and social order. This is usually the role 
played by the media in developed countries and often the reason for its 
unpopularity with governments. This also was the role played by the majority of 
media when reporting on HIV during Mbeki’s Presidency. 
• Facilitative: the media seek to create and sustain public debate. This is the essence 
of the public or civic journalism movement. 
• Critical/dialectical: journalists examine in a truly radical way the assumptions and 
premises of a community. The media’s role is to constitute public debate about, 
not within, the prevailing political order. 
 
2.5.3 Gatekeeping and framing  
According to Bolognesi (2006: 36) news values are determined by the players in the 
production of news. These players include media owners, editors, journalists and sources 
(in this case Bolognesi proposes the government, especially President Mbeki and his 
Health Ministers, as players). Driven by their news values the players will select 
(gatekeep) news items and frame the item in a particular way and thus set the agenda for 
the public. Gatekeeping can be defined as “... the process through which certain 
information passes a series of checkpoints (gates) before being finally accepted as news 
material ... As a result, readers, viewers and listeners are presented with only part of daily 
reality” (Bolognesi, 2006: 36). 
 
Oosthuizen (2001: 205) states that the reason why journalists focus on the elite as both 
objects and sources of news is because “some sources are also more powerful than others 
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or they have more bargaining power because of their status, market dominance or 
intrinsic value”. According to McQuail (cited by Oosthuizen, 2001: 205), the danger then 
is that news “is often what prominent people say about events rather than reports of the 
events themselves”. Oosthuizen (2001: 204) points out that this is how an authoritative 
source of news like a political leader often acts as a gatekeeper of news. 
 
Therefore the researcher assumes that President Mbeki and especially his Health 
Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, often were gatekeepers of news, and as a result 
journalists were rather reporting on what they said than reporting on the AIDS epidemic. 
In addition to sources, media owners may define broad guidelines that determine the style 
of journalism used by journalists, but they seldom exercise direct control over specific 
news stories (Oosthuizen, 2001: 197). 
 
2.5.4 The media in South Africa  
South Africa has an eclectic mix of media models. The South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), the state-owned public broadcaster, follows the developmental 
journalism model with its focus on nation building (Froneman, 2004, as cited by 
Swanepoel, 2005: 12). According to Fourie (2001: 274), the developmental model 
implies that the media must promote national development, autonomy and cultural 
identity. The most important principles are that the ideals of economic development 
should be emphasised and that certain liberties of the media should be made subordinate 
to the achievement of these ideals. At the same time, common objectives are given 
priority over individual freedom. According to Hachten (1992: 35), a development 
concept holds that: 
• All the instruments of mass communication must be mobilised by the central 
government to aid in the great task of nation building. 
• Authority should be supported, not challenged, therefore there is no place for 
dissent or criticism, which means that freedom of the press is restricted to the 
development needs of society. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
25 
 
• Information is the property of the state and the flow of power between the 
governors and the governed works from the top down, as in traditional 
authoritarianism. 
• Individual rights of expression are somewhat irrelevant in the face of problems 
like poverty, disease, etc. 
• In international news, each nation has a sovereign right to control both foreign 
journalists and the flow of news back and forth. 
 
According to Bolognesi (2006: 43), “the collaborative role of the press must become a 
more substantial element of South African media policy if citizens are to become 
empowered enough to build up their spirits and their nation”. 
 
However, Fourie (2001: 269) argues that the “power that governments claim for 
themselves usually conflicts with the democratic right of freedom of speech, a right 
which is important to newspapers as it enables them to perform their functions 
properly”. 
 
The SABC’s reporting was in flux during Mbeki’s reign. A journalist for the SABC 
during the period from 1999 to 2002 stated that she filed “critical after critical report 
about both Manto and Mbeki”, which meant that a surveillance role was being 
followed, although she had to bypass management and liaise closely with her editor to 
ensure her critical reports were broadcast (Journalist A, Personal communication, 31 
July 2012). The journalist felt pressure from management to follow a development role 
when she tried to file a critical report for the TV evening news bulletin, including 
comments from AIDS activists, when Mbeki did not turn up for a World AIDS Day 
event. She suspected that someone from government phoned Snuki Zikalala, head of 
news, which led to Zikalala entering the studio and forcing the journalist to remove the 
activists’ comments. 
 
On the other hand, newspapers like Die Son and Daily Sun function within a libertine 
model, which means that all forms of governance are rejected and freedom of the press 
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is of the utmost importance (Froneman, 2004, as cited by Swanepoel, 2005: 13). Some 
of the English media operate from the social responsibility paradigm, which endorses 
self-regulating principles. In the social responsibility model, the media also have certain 
responsibilities towards society, which are met through high professional standards, 
truth, accuracy, objectivity and balance by means of self-regulation, and not through 
government intervention as in the development model (McQuail, 1987: 117).  
According to McQuail (2000: 150), the social responsibility model is best suited for 
HIV reporting because of the focus on self-regulation, high professional standards and 
accountability.  
 
The Mail & Guardian took on a surveillance role in the social responsibility paradigm 
by constantly acting as a watchdog in exposing violations of the moral and social order. 
An example was the newspaper’s reporting on the debate that the government’s rollout 
of ARVs was too slow. On 12 July 2004, the TAC’s report on the status of the ARV 
rollout was published in the Mail & Guardian under the headline, “Slow road to drugs 
rollout” (Hassan, 2004). 
 
Drawing on Fourie’s roles that the media can play (2001: 276), the researcher found 
that The Sowetan fulfilled a collaborative role in relation to the government’s ideals 
when reporting on HIV. While most South African media took a critical stance towards 
Mbeki and his government’s dissident views, the newspaper formed an in-house 
journalist committee to establish whether Mbeki had indeed said that HIV did not cause 
AIDS (Malan, 2003: 94). By doing this the publication chose to support the government 
and its ideals. The Citizen also played a collaborative role when AIDS dissident editor 
Martin Williams wrote an editorial supporting President Mbeki’s HIV dissidence views 
and published various HIV dissident opinions (Williams, 2000). 
 
2.5.5 Mbeki and his government’s view on reporting 
A new media policy, which would operate from a socially responsible paradigm, was 
encouraged during the time of Mbeki’s Presidency. On 29 November 2000, Dr Essop 
Pahad, Minister in the Presidency from 1999 to 2008, introduced the Media Development 
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and Diversity Agency (MDDA) during a conference for government communicators 
(Swanepoel, 2005: 12). According to Pahad, the participatory approach is part of the 
character of the MDDA and the agency was established on the recommendation of 
Comtask, the government’s communications task group, “to act as a catalyst for further 
development and diversification of the entire media industry of this country” (Swanepoel, 
2005: 12).  
 
Khanyi Mkoza (2004: 116), chairperson of the MDDA, explained participatory 
communication as follows: 
 
It takes into consideration the views and input of the receiver of information. It 
initiates an inquiry process leading to sharpened consciousness of social, human 
and political developments. This type of inquiry encourages people to want to be 
part of the development and transformation process. Participation is the key 
element to awakening people’s desire to assess their problems critically, to ask 
why these problems occur and how to overcome them using their own wisdom, 
experience and knowledge. 
 
According to McQuail (1987: 120), participatory communication is at the heart of the 
development journalism model, which explains why the MDDA was formed. Bolognesi 
(2006: 40) says that, in spite of development journalism’s nation-building attributes, it 
must be approached “with caution and implemented with balance in order to avoid the 
risk of sunshine journalism”. Bolognesi (2006: 41) also warns that government control 
within the model of developmental journalism would compromise the “conscience of our 
society and threaten the very ideal of democracy”. 
 
Fourie (2001: 274) defines development theory as the right of government “to intervene 
by restricting and censoring the media. State subsidies and direct control are therefore 
justifiable”. 
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Such government control would certainly threaten “the very ideal of democracy”. Within 
this theoretical context, and within the context of this study, the South African 
government therefore would enjoy free political exploitation of HIV and AIDS. 
According to Charlene Smith, a South African freelance journalist who was raped in 
1999 and announced it publicly herself, President Mbeki tried to restrict and publicly 
criticised her after she campaigned that ARVs should be given to rape victims for free. 
She wrote a number of articles in the local and international media on the subject (Smith, 
personal communication, 20 May 2011). Smith (2011) also said that Mbeki claimed that 
she “was leading the media conspiracy against him”. Smith wrote in her book, Proud of 
me: speaking out against sexual violence and HIV: 
 
The virus (HIV), and its spread, is a lot more than just another disease. Its 
eradication does not depend only on the development of a vaccine. It is a disease 
that will come under control only when social relationships are reformed. But 
those who say as much publicly in South Africa have experienced direct attacks 
from President Thabo Mbeki (Smith 2001: 268). 
 
Smith was publicly attacked by Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma on various occasions. She was 
first attacked by Dlamini-Zuma  in May 1999 (a month after she was raped) in a press 
release in which the minister stated that Smith was in the pay of pharmaceutical 
companies because she was the first person to call for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) 
after rape (Smith, personal communication, 20 May 2011). In December 1999, Mbeki 
said in parliament that Smith’s call for ARVs was wrong and that ARVs are toxic (Smith, 
2011). In July 2000, Mbeki publicly criticised Smith at the International AIDS 
Conference in Durban (Malan, 2003: 94). Just before the conference, Mbeki 
corresponded with then opposition party leader Tony Leon because he was outraged 
about a Washington Post article written by Smith. Mbeki accused her of being 
“sufficiently brave or blinded by racist rage” (Malan, 2003: 97). Mbeki’s rage against 
Smith resulted in the following: 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
29 
 
The personal accusations that Mbeki had made in his by now widely published 
letter, along with the controversy surrounding his presidential AIDS panel and the 
contents of his opening speech that night, set the tone for media coverage of the 
Durban conference to become – in the government’s own words – a ‘Mbeki-
bashing bazaar, instead of a documentation of the latest advances in HIV and 
AIDS research’ (Mbeki’s man in AIDS plea, 2000: 1, as cited by Malan, 2003: 
98).  
 
Smith was not the only journalist who experienced criticism and even restriction by 
government after she filed a story on the same MRC report (that found AIDS to be the 
single biggest cause of mortality in South Africa) referred to by Smith in her You 
magazine article (Malan, 2003: 107). A reporter of The Star,  Lynne Altenroxel, wrote in 
an article that “since mid-February, an investigator has been tracking down, interrogating 
– and even suggesting lie-detector tests on – a host of people who might have had access 
to the controversial document” (the government had put a hold on the controversial MRC 
report’s release date because they doubted the findings, but someone leaked it to the 
media, raising the fury of the Health Minister and the President and resulting in their 
denial of the results) (Altenroxel, 2000: 1, as cited by Malan, 2003: 107).  
 
Malan, a journalist for the SABC from 1999 to 2002, indirectly experienced restriction by 
government when she wanted to report on Mbeki not turning up at a World AIDS Day 
gathering, with HIV activists’ comments on this (Malan, personal communication, 31 
July 2012). According to Malan, after she had done a radio report and wanted to file a 
report for the evening TV news bulletin, Snuki Zikalala, head of news, came into the 
studio and forced her to remove the comments by activists, stating: “It’s unfair to criticise 
the president while he’s not in the country”. She suspects Zikalala had probably received 
a call from someone in government. 
 
Roelofse (1996, cited by Fourie 2001), explains this relationship between government 
and the media as follows: “... since government generally have the power to restrict 
newspapers’ criticism of government, and since the press usually assumes a surveillance 
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role on behalf of society, tensions and conflicts between these two institutions are natural 
to be expected”. 
 
2.6  Overview of the main findings in the literature review 
A summary of the main findings drawn from the literature review is essential to highlight 
the main issues in order to provide a framework for the content analysis of media reports 
during Mbeki’s Presidency. These are the following: 
• Two recent studies have shown that Mbeki’s denialism and HIV policy led to 
more than 330 000 deaths. 
• According to media studies, media reporting from 1999 to 2008 focused on 
conflicts surrounding HIV and AIDS, and Mbeki’s framing of the crisis had a 
censoring effect on the media. 
• These findings are alarming if you consider the big influence the mass media have 
in a state of crisis and instability, like that created by the AIDS epidemic, and in a 
society that is generally poorly educated.  
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3 Public understanding of HIV and AIDS in South Africa 
 
3.1 Public understanding of science 
In 1985 an ad hoc group set up by the British Royal Society, the oldest national scientific 
society in the world, stated in its report entitled The public understanding of science that 
“our national prosperity depends on science understanding” and that the improvement of 
science understanding is not a luxury but “an investment in future” (Broks, 1996, as cited 
by Gething, 2001: 40). Public science literacy is increasingly being recognised as an 
important component of long-term social and economic growth, of effective citizenship 
and of being better equipped for life in an advanced society (Evans and Durant, 1989, as 
cited by Pouris, 1991; National Science Board, 1989, as cited by Pouris, 1991). 
 
A proposed definition of science literacy includes four elements: (a) knowledge of basic 
textbook facts of science; (b) an understanding of methods, such as probability reasoning 
and experimental design; (c) an appreciation of the positive outcomes of science and 
technology for society; (d) the rejection of “superstition” (Miller, 1983, 1992, as cited by 
Bauer, 2008: 115). 
 
According to Bauer (2008: 115), scientific literacy is necessary because of the following 
factors: 
1. Science education is part of basic literacy in reading, writing and numeracy. 
2. Science literacy is a necessary part of civic competence. 
Bauer explains that, in a democracy, people take part in the political decisions, but these 
decisions are only effective if “he or she is familiar with the political process” (Althaus, 
1998, as cited by Bauer, 2008: 115). According to Bauer, the same concept applies to 
scientific literacy: “The assumption is that scientific as well as political ignorance breeds 
alienation and extremism, hence the quest for ‘civic scientific literacy’” (Miller, 1998, as 
cited by Bauer, 2008: 115). 
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The British Council Global Education Darwin Survey (2009) surveyed over ten thousand 
adults from ten countries (Argentina, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, 
Spain, Great Britain and the USA). These adults were questioned on their views on the 
statement, “enough scientific evidence exists to support Charles Darwin’s theory of 
evolution”. The results show that the majority of adults in these countries had heard of 
Charles Darwin and knew at least a little bit of his theory of evolution, with the highest 
levels of knowledge being found in Great Britain, the USA, Mexico, Argentina, China 
and Russia. In contrast, 73% of adults surveyed in South Africa had never heard of 
Charles Darwin or of his theory of evolution.  
 
The first study on public science literacy in South Africa was undertaken in 1991 (Pouris, 
1991: 358-359). This survey, conducted among 1 300 people, found that 32% of the 
respondents indicated that astrology was very scientific, while 31% indicated that it was 
“sort of scientific”. Seventy-two percent believed that science makes our lives 
comfortable, and 66% believed that because of science the world is a better place.  
However, 71% of the respondents said that “we depend too much on science and not 
enough on faith”. 
 
In a recent South African study (Claassen, 2011), the statement “the South African public 
is gullible about much science news, easily believing in miracle cures or solutions to 
difficult problems” was given to 360 journalists and 740 scientists to determine their 
agreement or disagreement. Thirty-seven percent of the journalists and 31% of the 
scientists strongly agreed, whereas 52% of the journalists and 51% of the scientists 
somewhat agreed. As part of the same study, Claassen sent a set of questions to South 
African journalists, and the answers “show in some sense the ignorance of journalists 
about evidence-based science” (Claassen, 2011: 358). In this survey, 65% of the 
journalists believed that science had established that cold fusion is possible, 49% did not 
know or have an opinion on whether lead causes mental impairment, 11% did not know 
that cholesterol causes heart attacks, and as many as 9% of journalists did not know that 
HIV causes AIDS. 
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Bucchi (2004) highlights the importance of better communication between journalists and 
scientists, and that scientists communicating their findings through the media is an 
important aspect of the public’s understanding of science. Claassen (2011: 353) explains 
that it is only a “sound relationship” between scientists and the media that can better the 
public understanding of science. The following findings by Claassen (2011) on the media 
and scientists in South Africa are highlighted (Sections 3.1.1. and 3.1.2 below). 
 
3.1.1 Media in South Africa 
In South Africa the media do report on science, but not in a structured media 
environment. Only one publication, the daily newspaper Business Day, has a structured 
science desk, managed by a science editor with a team of trained science journalists 
(2011: 352). The status of science reporting in South Africa needs urgent attention 
because science journalists are untrained and are mostly scientifically illiterate (2011: 
363). 
 
3.1.2 Scientists in South Africa 
The survey results, from the scientists as well as the journalists, showed that scientists are 
significantly unwilling to communicate with journalists (2011: 362). More than 12% of 
scientists (one in eight of 740 scientists) were “not at all willing” to “take a course that 
would help you communicate better with journalists and the public”, and nearly 13% 
were “not at all willing” to “have a continuing series of visits and conversations with a 
member of the news media” (2011: 362). When journalists were asked “How accessible 
do you generally find scientists, engineers and members of allied professions?”, only 
13% regarded them as “very” accessible (2011: 362). 
 
Bucchi (2004: 108-109) defines this attitude among scientists as the “diffusionist 
conception”: 
 
... indubitably simplistic and idealized, which holds that scientific facts need only 
be transported from a specialist context to a popular one, is rooted in the 
professional ideologies of two of the categories of actors involved. On the one 
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hand, it legitimates the social and professional role of the ‘mediators’ – 
popularizers, and scientific journalists in particular – who undoubtedly comprise 
the most visible and the most closely studied component of the mediation. On the 
other hand, it authorizes scientists to proclaim themselves extraneous to the 
process of public communication so that they may be free to criticize errors and 
excesses – especially in terms of distortion and sensationalism. There has thus 
arisen a view of the media as a ‘dirty mirror’ held up to science, an opaque lens 
unable adequately to reflect and filter scientific facts. 
 
3.2 The problem with textbook science versus frontier science 
Claassen refers to Bauer’s definition of the difference between textbook science and 
frontier science (Bauer, 1992: 37, as cited by Claassen, 2011: 355) as: 
 
Textbook science is the settled scientific knowledge on which (in natural 
sciences) one can build one’s own work. In contrast, frontier science is science as 
it is actually being conducted. Its results have just been obtained, they are 
uncertain and unconfirmed. 
 
According to Claassen (2011: 355), journalists often fail to make a distinction between 
textbook science and frontier science “when complex research findings are reduced to 
misleading headlines and reports that deductions which are either exaggerated or 
blatantly wrong”. Malan (2003: 86) states that some journalists reported on Virodene, 
which was claimed to be a “cure” for AIDS in 1997 but turned out to contain a highly 
toxic industrial solvent, as a potential cure for AIDS because “virtually no reporters” had 
a scientific background at that stage. 
 
Claassen (2011: 355) provides another example why journalists often fail to make a 
distinction between textbook science and frontier science and states why this confuses the 
public: 
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In the medical field, the media quite often report on medical research findings 
published in scientific magazines in a sensational way, as if the final word has 
been spoken about, for example, the causes of cardiovascular disease or cancer. 
Frontier science is thus presented by the media as textbook science, only to be 
refuted a few months later by a contradictory report. This confuses the public, 
whose main source of information is the media and not scientific publications. 
 
According to Claassen (2011: 355) the problem lies with the media as well as with 
scientists, because the media “do not understand scientific research as a long process with 
preliminary findings” and the scientists do not communicate properly and directly with 
science journalists. However, Adelmann-Grill, Waksman and Kreutzberg (1995: 2) state 
that the problem is that citizens “are not much interested in textbook science but in 
frontier science”. 
 
3.3 Public understanding of HIV and AIDS 
Demographic and health survey data from nine African countries show that women tend 
to have less HIV prevention knowledge than men (Glick & Sahn, 2005:394). Fewer than 
half of adult respondents can identify specific HIV prevention behaviours (Glick & Sahn, 
2005: 383). Data from 35 of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa reveal that, on average, 
young men were 20% more likely to know how to prevent the sexual transmission of 
HIV than young women (UNAIDS and WHO, 2005). 
 
loveLife, one of South Africa’s biggest non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was 
established in 1999 to help prevent the spread of HIV by educating young people about 
the virus and about the importance of knowing your HIV status (De Kock, 2008: 9). De 
Kock refers to a 2004 survey by Professor Danie Jordaan of the School of Language, 
Media and Culture at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, who found that one of 
the loveLife campaigns (billboards) was ineffective because it did not consider 
“variances in culture, religion, belief systems and socio-economic contexts in South 
Africa” (De Kock, 2008: 9). Another reason why the loveLife campaigns are allegedly 
not working, especially in rural areas, is the high rates of illiteracy among some South 
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Africans (De Kock, 2008: 9). This will be discussed further under the heading, “The 
knowledge gap theory” (Section 3.6). 
 
Cultural traditions also have an influence on public understanding of HIV and AIDS in 
South Africa. It is common in many traditional African cultures to attribute illness to 
spirits and supernatural forces (AIDS-weekly, 2001 as cited by Kalichman & Simbayi, 
2004: 573).  In a joint study by the University of Connecticut and the Human Sciences 
Research Council in Cape Town, 33% of 487 respondents living in a Black township in 
the city were ignorant of the causes of AIDS (Kalichman & Simbayi, 2004: 572). 
According to the survey results, 11% believed that AIDS is caused by spirits and 
supernatural forces, 21% were unsure if AIDS is caused by spirits and the supernatural, 
and 68% did not believe that AIDS is caused by spirits and supernatural forces. 
 
More recent results from the 2009 National Communication Survey (NCS) in South 
Africa suggest that knowledge of HIV prevention methods is high: a knowledge level of 
87% for condom usage to prevent HIV across age groups 15 to 24; however, their 
knowledge of other HIV prevention methods such as faithfulness, partner reduction and 
abstinence is lower, but has improved since the 2006 National Communication Survey 
(National Communication Survey, 2009). According to the 2009 NCS, the knowledge 
allowing people living with HIV to be healthy has “significantly increased” since the 
2006 survey. In 2009, 87% identified antiretroviral therapy (ART) as treatment and 73% 
said ART must be used for life, in comparison to the 2006 NCS – 42% identified ART 
and 40% knew it was for life. 
 
3.4 HIV ‘treatment literacy’ 
In an article summarising a campaign led by the TAC for access to medicines for HIV, 
Heywood (2009: 17) states that the TAC found the right to health cannot be utilised 
effectively unless health itself is better understood by South Africans. The idea of HIV 
“treatment literacy” was first utilised in the United States by AIDS activists who had HIV 
themselves (Heywood, 2009: 14).  
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In the late 1990s, this model was adopted by South Africa and the TAC became the first 
AIDS activist organisation in a developing country to pioneer the concept and practice of 
“treatment literacy” (Heywood, 2009: 17). TAC volunteers who have been trained and 
have passed an examination are called Treatment Literacy Practitioners (TLPs), and are 
then assigned to clinics, hospitals and community organisations for further training. Most 
TLPs are placed in clinics where “they would explain the importance of HIV testing and 
treatment to crowded waiting rooms (Geffen, 2010: 190). In 2007, 200 people were 
trained throughout South Africa and, according to Zackie Achmat, TAC Deputy General 
at the time, the TLPs provided information to over 100 000 people per month (Heywood, 
2009: 17). 
 
Nattrass (2007: 166) calls the TAC’s treatment literacy programme “the most important 
mass cultural project in South Africa in support of science”. Nattrass also points out that 
the advantage of this programme is that HAART patients are assisted to understand the 
nature of various monitoring tests and empowered to engage with their doctors over side-
effects and treatment regimens. Geffen (2010: 191) states that the TAC’s treatment 
literacy programme “was pioneering and crucial to the success of the first large Haart 
projects”, such as the ones in Khayelitsha and in the small town of Lusikisiki in the 
Eastern Cape. 
 
The success of treatment literacy programmes can be proven by the fact that several 
programmes in which treatment education has been lacking have failed to do well 
because of low uptake and poor adherence (Geffen, 2010: 191). 
 
Geffen writes in his 2010 book, Debunking delusions: the inside story of the Treatment 
Action Campaign, that the TAC’s literacy programmes are unfortunately not as strong as 
they once were and that no proper quantitative research has been done on the benefits of 
treatment literacy for HAART adherence or uptake, and there has been no proper analysis 
of the effects of treatment literacy. 
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3.5 Reasons for South Africa’s low level of science understanding 
Blankley and Arnold (2001) found that international experience shows that the biggest 
impact on the levels of public understanding of science is the delivery of science and 
maths teaching at schools and at the higher education level. 
 
Blankley and Arnold (2001: 65) found in a sample population of 2 207 randomly selected 
adults (18 years and older) that over 30% of them had never studied mathematics at 
school, 50% had never studied biological science and 55% had never studied physical or 
chemical science. The percentage of respondents who had passed mathematics or science 
at secondary school were much lower. At matriculation level, only 20% had passed 
maths, 14% had passed physical or chemical science and only 18% had passed biology. 
 
The most effective way of achieving a higher proportion of scientifically literate citizens 
is to improve pre-university and university education: however, South African adults 
have passed through the education system without attaining a sufficient background in 
mathematics and science (Blankley & Arnold, 2001: 65). According to Blankley and 
Arnold (2001), most South Africans thus lack the background to take an informed interest 
in scientific matters and understand the available information.  
 
Blankley and Arnold (2001) also found that the low levels of understanding of science in 
South Africa creates the danger that public debates on issues such as HIV and AIDS are 
likely to be guided, even swayed, by those with special interests or agendas. According to 
Blankley and Arnold (2001: 69): 
 
Ways have to be found to increase levels of understanding among the large cohort 
of adults who suffered under or boycotted apartheid education, and using mass 
media might be an effective way of developing such and understanding, given the 
levels of interest in science.... 
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The media can play an important role in making science more accessible and 
understandable. The reach of some of the mass media in South Africa is as follows 
(SAARF AMPS, 2011): 
• 30,8% (10,761 million) of the South African adult population read a daily 
newspaper. 
• 34,1% (11,915 million) of the South African adult population read a weekly 
newspaper. 
• The total newspaper readership of the South African adult population is 49,9% 
(17,072 million readers aged 15+). 
• 50,5% (17,624 million) of the South African adult population read magazines. 
• 27,645 million South Africans (79,1%) watch SABC 1 on a weekly basis. 
• 24,684 million South Africans (70,7%) watch SABC 2 on a weekly basis. 
• 20,041 million South Africans (57,4%) watch SABC 3 on a weekly basis. 
• e.tv’s weekly reach is 23,546 million South Africans (67,4%). 
• 9,198 million South Africans (26,3) watch DStv on a weekly basis. 
• In an average week, 92,7% of all South African adults listen to radio. 
• There are 5,94 million South African adult internet users in an average week.  
• 6,93 million South African adults accessed the internet in the four weeks before 
11 December 2011. 
• In 2001, 1,82 million South Africans had access to the internet (Media 
Africa.com, 2000 as cited by Blankley & Arnold, 2001: 69). 
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3.6 The knowledge gap theory 
The knowledge gap theory was first proposed in 1970 by Tichenor, Donohue and Olien, 
who stated that “knowledge, like any other kind of wealth, is not distributed equally 
throughout our society” (Severin & Tankard, 1988: 285, as cited by Turner, 2008: 24). 
The knowledge gap theory is defined by McQuail (2005: 559) as a theory that refers to 
“structured differences in information levels between groups in society”; “The original 
promise was that it would help close the gaps between ‘information rich’ and the 
‘information poor’ ... newspapers have been better at closing gaps than television”. 
 
Knowledge gap theory applies to a great extent to citizens in the rural areas of South 
Africa. According to Statistics SA, 366 590 people in the Eastern Cape have not had any 
form of education (De Kock, 2008: 9). This illustrates another reason why loveLife’s 
campaigns in the Eastern Cape did not work, as mentioned earlier. De Kock wrote in The 
Herald, a daily newspaper in East London, on 14 April 2008 that, according to surveys, 
illiterate people in the Eastern Cape were not able to follow what loveLife campaigns 
were trying to tell them (De Kock, 2008: 9). This implies that the HIV knowledge gap 
between literate and illiterate young people in South Africa was made even bigger.  
 
However, high media attention, especially to controversial issues (like with the case of 
media coverage of HIV in South Africa) tends to “bring public discussion to a boil, 
dispersing communication throughout the community system, equalising knowledge 
gaps” in some cases (Gaziano, 1996: 134). 
 
3.7 The digital divide 
The term ‘digital divide’ has been used widely since the development of computer-based 
digital means of communication, and is used in place of the older term ‘knowledge gap’ 
(Norris, 2002, as cited by McQuail, 2005: 491). According to McQuail (2005: 554) there 
are new inequalities being opened up by this new form of media and they derive from the 
relatively large cost of equipment, dependence on advanced infrastructure and the higher 
skills needed to communicate. McQuail (2005: 559) adds, “Current expectations are that 
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new media are more likely to widen than to close gaps because of their differential 
availability to the already better informed”. 
 
Statistics SA’s latest report on rural development does not state statistics on internet 
usage. However, this report provides statistics on rural areas’ access to telephones and 
cell phones, which will provide a good indication of how many people will have access to 
internet through their cell phones or possibly will have access to ADSL if they have a 
landline installed. 
 
In general, the Statistics SA report shows that, in 13 rural areas, about one in every four 
households (22,3%) has access to a telephone or regular use of a cell phone (Lehohla, 
2002: 84). If these results are compared to the national average of one in every three 
households (33,7%) with access to a telephone or a cellular phone, the proportion is low. 
Once again the Eastern Cape is worth mentioning. In the Alfred Nzo area in the Eastern 
Cape, access to a telephone is the lowest, with only one in every seven households 
(15,1%) having access (Lehohla, 2002: 84). 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a bird’s eye view of the South African public’s understanding of 
science, their understanding of HIV and AIDS, as well as their low level of science 
understanding. 
 
Research done in 2006 showed that South Africans’ knowledge of HIV was relatively 
low, but a survey in 2009 showed that their knowledge had increased significantly, and 
that this was “a boost on communication efforts on treatment literacy over the last few 
years” (National Communication Survey, 2009). 
 
The information in this chapter provides probable explanations for why Mbeki and his 
government could get away with not providing ARVs for so long without being called to 
justice earlier. 
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4 Hampering AIDS treatment: The South African 
government’s courtship of pseudoscience 
 
But the AIDS denialism case is also a terrifying clear example of why superstition is 
dangerous to the point of lethality, and hence something much more important than just 
the obsession of a small number of self-professed sceptics who think they know better 
than everyone else (Pigliucci, 2010: 61). 
 
4.1 What is pseudoscience? 
The mid-twentieth-century philosopher of science, Karl Popper, first identified what he 
called “the demarcation problem” (the question of how to tell the difference between 
science and pseudoscience), and declared “falsifiability” as the ultimate criterion of 
demarcation (Popper, 1968). By “falsifiability” Popper meant that a science theory is 
capable of being proven wrong or right by observation or experiment; any theory or claim 
must therefore be testable. 
 
Pigliucci (2010: 304) concedes in his book, Nonsense on stilts: how to tell science from 
bunk, that the “boundaries separating science, non-science and pseudoscience are much 
fuzzier and more permeable than Popper (or, for that matter most scientists) have us 
believe”. Pigliucci states there is no “litmus test” to test if something is science or 
pseudoscience, but that we must always turn on our “baloney detector”. Carl Sagan, who 
created the term “baloney detector”, states, “in the course of their training, scientists are 
equipped with a baloney detection kit. The kit is brought out as a matter of course 
whenever new ideas are offered for consideration ... What’s in the kit? Tools for sceptical 
thinking” (1997: 209-210). 
 
According to Sagan (1997: 210), sceptical thinking is “the means to construct, and to 
understand, a reasoned argument and – especially important – to recognize a fallacious or 
fraudulent argument”.  He explains how this “baloney” can be dangerous if one does not 
exercise “sceptical thinking” (Sagan, 1997: 196): 
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A deception arises, sometimes innocently but collaboratively, sometimes with 
cynical premeditation. Usually the victim is caught up in a powerful emotion – 
wonder, fear, greed, grief. Credulous acceptance of baloney can cost you money 
... But it can be much more dangerous than that, and when governments and 
societies lose the capacity for critical thinking, the results can be catastrophic, 
however sympathetic we may be to those who have bought the baloney. 
 
Pigliucci refers to AIDS denialism in Africa as “death by pseudoscience” and explains 
(2010: 59): 
 
As a complex nation with a tense history of racial relations, to say the least, 
perhaps it was inevitable for South Africa to become fertile ground for a rejection 
of Western medicine in favour of local traditions and solutions. Still, it is simply 
astounding to discover the depths of irrationality reached by some South African 
leaders – and the absurd cost of human lives that their inane policies are directly 
causing. 
According to Michael Shermer, “creationism” in America is an example of 
pseudoscience because it is threatening science education in the country and is confusing 
the public about the theory of evolution (Shermer, 2011: 92). Shermer further proposes a 
possible practical criterion to solve the demarcation problem (2011: 92):  
... does the revolutionary new idea generate any interest on the part of working 
scientists for adoption in their research programs, produce any new lines of 
research, lead to any new discoveries, or influence any existing hypotheses, 
models, paradigms or worldviews? If not, chances are it is pseudoscience. 
Park (2000: 10) believes pseudoscience to result in a danger to society when its 
practitioners (for example someone who designed magnets that can draw energy from the 
earth) believe it to be science and that pseudoscience “has a way of evolving through 
almost imperceptible steps from self-delusion to fraud”. 
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Makgoba (2002: 1899) states that pseudoscience is unfortunately likely to flourish in the 
following context: 
 
The yearning need for science to be understood by the public; the need for 
scientists to communicate better; the need for the public to make choices about 
what science has to offer in their daily life; the need for the public to participate 
and shape the scientific process; the need for science to integrate the wealth of 
information that is already existent has never been greater than today. Perhaps no 
examples illustrate this better than the revolution in biology (the Human Genome 
Project and embryo stem cell research/therapy) and the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV)/AIDS epidemic that are sweeping sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
Makgoba further refers to the “contributions to the evolution of pseudoscience” and 
points to “government” and “politics” as two of the contributors in South Africa’s 
“evolution of pseudoscience”.  He (2002: 1902) explains his view on pseudoscience and 
how it played out in South Africa: 
 
When science cannot be separated from ideology or when scientific truth becomes 
amalgamated with an ideology it becomes pseudoscience. When eminent 
scientists misrepresents (sic), distorts (sic), refuse to acknowledge scientific 
findings to promote or draw attention for publicity because of failed career 
ambitions or other agendas – that is pseudoscience. When politicians, journalists 
and the nations (sic) intelligentsia control the flow of information, distorts (sic) or 
misrepresent the facts of science for a short-term ideological gain – that is 
pseudoscience; when powerful persons in society conflate causation and cofactors 
of HIV/AIDS through a mixture of pseudoscientific statements or clever wordplay 
– that is pseudoscience; when powerful nations/institutions impose their own 
ethical standards in science on weaker nations/institutions in order to get their 
interests/agenda fulfilled at the expense of the weak and powerless – that is 
pseudoscience; when science is being used by the powerful to promote ignorance 
or confuse rather than assault ignorance – that is pseudoscience. 
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4.2 ‘State-sponsored support of pseudoscience’ in South Africa 
Pigliucci (2010: 59) asks how it is possible that a non-scientifically proven concoction 
can be sold to South Africans as a cure, condemning them to death by choosing magic 
over science. He answers his own question: 
 
Because of the positions taken by former President Thabo Mbeki and by his then 
(until September 2008) Health Minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, among 
others. Their attitude has been that antiretroviral drugs, which have been 
medically tested and shown to be effective against AIDS, are poisons deliberately 
marketed by Western pharmaceutical companies. 
 
The South African government’s response to the HIV epidemic has been highly 
controversial. Geffen (2006: 2) states that the rollout of highly effective antiretroviral 
treatment (HAART) has been undermined by the government directly through the 
“inclusion of discredited scientists and non-scientists on President Mbeki’s ‘AIDS Panel’ 
to ‘discover facts’”, and indirectly through the failure of government to act against 
pseudoscientists promoting alternative remedies for HAART. According to Geffen (2006: 
2), pseudoscientists are those who purport to work within the scientific paradigm, but 
who ignore or misrepresent accumulated scientific knowledge, fail to adhere to 
established scientific methods of research, and use scientific rhetoric when promoting 
their alternative remedies. 
 
Geffen (2006: 2) explains: 
 
It is in this sense (inclusion of discredited scientists on the AIDS panel and failure 
of government to act against pseudoscientists) that there has been state-sponsored 
support for pseudoscience. At best, this has sown confusion and at worst, it has 
resulted in unnecessary deaths and has deflected attention of health officials from 
building the public health sector and expanding the Haart rollout. 
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4.2.1 Support for AIDS denialists 
According to Nattrass (2008: 166) AIDS denialists have various approaches to HIV 
science: “some dispute the existence of the virus and other merely its virulence”. But 
even though there are different approaches, AIDS denialists are united by their beliefs 
that AIDS science is wrong and that deaths are caused by malnutrition, narcotics and 
ARVs (Nattrass, 2007: 23). Geffen (2006: 3) points out that President Thabo Mbeki and 
Health Minister Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang had “courted pseudoscientific theories 
about AIDS” since 1997, as discussed below.  
 
4.2.1.1 ‘The Virodene affair’ 
Firstly there was the Virodene saga in 1997. Then Health Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma invited University of Pretoria scientists Ziggie and Olga Visser, who claimed to 
have found a “cure” for AIDS, and some of their patients to a cabinet meeting (Malan, 
2003: 63; Nattrass, 2008: 160). After the meeting, the cabinet, which included only “one 
medical doctor and no scientists”, rose to their feet and applauded the new AIDS “cure” 
(Sidley, 1997: 450). According to Sidley (1997: 450), these scientists did not follow the 
usual path of conducting research and then registering drugs before giving their 
information to journalists. It was also strange that they did not present their “discovery” 
to a team of scientists and researcher, but rather to the cabinet. After the meeting, Mbeki 
promoted “research” on the use of the toxic “drug” Virodene and also played a prominent 
role in attempts to fast-track the registration of this widely condemned “cure for AIDS” 
(Jacobs & Johnson, 2007: 7; Malan, 2003: 63).  
 
Sidley (1997: 450) explains the possible reason for Mbeki and his government’s interest 
in Virodene as follows: “... the government’s interest in the ‘miracle’ drug was financial 
and that it did not want to see any discovery of this nature in the hands of drug 
companies”. However, South Africa’s regulatory authority, the Medicines Control 
Council (MCC), found fault with the Visser’s scientific rationale and with their proposed 
clinical trial design (Nattrass, 2008: 160).  
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James Myburgh (2007c), who wrote a series of articles titled The virodene affair, 
believes “... ANC leaders had clearly become deeply emotionally involved and 
financially invested in the development of Virodene as an African cure for AIDS”. 
 
Clinical trials on Virodene were done elsewhere (phase 1 in London and phase 2 in 
Tanzania). According to Myburgh (2007d), the report on the “unblinded results” of phase 
2 revealed that “Virodene was no cure for AIDS”. Myburgh believes that Virodene was 
the reason for the government’s aversion to ARVs and, after it was finally proven that 
Virodene was not the “African cure for AIDS”, the “cabinet announced an abrupt reversal 
of its policy towards anti-retroviral drugs”, which meant that Nevirapine would be 
provided to all pregnant women and ARV treatment would be made available to rape 
victims. 
 
Although the South African government finally let go of its hope that Virodene would be 
the African cure for AIDS, “... the Virodene story reeks of financial corruption and 
ultimately led to the destruction of the independence of the Medicines Control Council 
...” (Geffen, 2010: 125). 
 
4.2.1.2 Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel 
In 2000 Mbeki convened a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel1 to research the cause of 
AIDS. The panel also included some noteworthy international “dissidents” who did not 
believe in the causal link between HIV and AIDS, as well as “orthodox” scientists who 
did (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007: 7).  
 
4.2.1.3 Support for Tine van der Maas 
Tshabalala-Msimang appeared in a documentary produced by Tine van der Maas, a 
retired nurse who sells nutritional supplements to patients as alternatives to HAART (Van 
der Maas et al., 2005, as cited by Geffen, 2006: 4). Van der Maas sells a nostrum called 
                                                 
1 The members of this panel can be found at 
http://www.polity.org.za/html/govdocs/reports/aids/chapter1.htm 
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“Africa’s Solution” as an AIDS remedy (McGregor, 2005 as cited by Nattrass, 2008: 
168). The documentary shows van der Maas’s sick patients doing well weeks after she 
treated them, but no proper diagnosis had been done to indicate what van der Maas had 
allegedly cured them from. In the scenes where Tshabalala-Msimang appears, “her 
behaviour is supportive of van der Maas” (Geffen, 2006: 4).  
 
In late 2003, the Health Minister sent Van der Maas to the home of Fana Kaba, a popular 
radio personality, as he lay sick dying of AIDS (McGregor, 2005, as cited by Nattrass, 
2008: 168). Although Kaba’s CD4 count – a measure of the number of white blood cells 
per cubic millimetre of blood used to analyse the prognosis of patients infected with HIV 
– was two cells per microlitre of blood at the time and he was not taking HAART, Van 
der Maas claimed she could treat him. Tshabalala-Msimang also sent Van der Maas to 
Nizipho Bhengu, the daughter of an ANC parliamentarian, who claimed she was 
completely healthy after going on Van der Maas’s lemon and garlic diet, but died a year 
after this public claim (Nattrass, 2007: 148). 
 
Tshabalala-Msimang “promoted Van der Maas’s activities a lot more substantially than 
merely referring her to potential patients” (Nattrass, 2008: 168). The Health Minister also 
arranged for Van der Maas to address a meeting of all the provincial health ministers, 
after which she was invited to conduct “trials” with AIDS patients at government 
hospitals and clinics without obtaining permission from the Medicines Control Council 
(McGregor, 2005, as cited by Nattrass, 2008: 168; Nattrass, 2007: 148). 
 
4.2.1.4 Ubhejane remedy – from a truck driver’s dream to AIDS clinics 
Tshabalala-Msimang seems to have ignored medicine legislation when it came to 
“traditional” or “alternative” remedies, and supported the distribution of an untested 
product through the public health system.  In 2006 a herbal product called Ubhejane was 
distributed through AIDS clinics in KwaZulu-Natal (Nattrass, 2008: 171). According to 
Nattrass (2007: 162), Ubhejane was invented by truck driver Zeblon Gwala, who said the 
recipe came to him in a dream. It consisted of two varieties – the liquid in recycled milk 
bottles with a blue lid “reduces the amount of virus in the blood”, and the milk bottles 
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with a white lid “rebuilds the immune system”, although Gwala said he did not know 
how it worked: 
 
Ubhejane protects the cells from any virus ... I don’t know how that happens. I am 
not a scientist. But what I do know is that people who were on the edge of death 
go back to work. It makes them feel better, and gives them life ... The people who 
want to take those ARVs can take them ... But they don’t cure anything. The side 
effects are like poison, and people get sicker. Ubhejane doesn’t hurt anyone. And 
it works. I can feel it (Specter, 2007: 32-34, as cited by Nattrass, 2007: 183). 
 
 Ubhejane was later implicated by doctors as being responsible for liver failure and, when 
the Democratic Alliance (DA) complained, the Department of Health “reported that the 
DA was simply perpetuating racist stereotypes” (Nattrass, 2007: 162). 
 
4.2.2 Matthias Rath – ‘most damaging example of state-supported 
pseudoscience’ 
Matthias Rath is a German pharmaceutical proprietor who claims that multivitamins treat 
or cure a number of diseases, including cancer, heart disease, diabetes, asthma and AIDS 
(Geffen, 2006:5). According to Geffen (2006), Rath began operating in South Africa in 
2004 and set up a section 21 company called the Rath Health Foundation Africa that sells 
multivitamins. According to Rath, AIDS is a disease that can be cured solely through 
nutritional supplements. Rath’s biggest marketing strategy was to campaign against 
established medicines and the “pharmaceutical drug cartel” that manufactures these 
medicines (Nattrass, 2007: 149).  
 
In 2004, Harvard researchers found that “multivitamin supplements delay the progression 
of HIV disease and provide an effective, low-cost means of delaying the initiation of 
antiretroviral therapy in HIV-infected women (Fawzi et al., 2004). Rath used these 
results to promote his vitamins as an alternative to HAART (Geffen, 2006: 9). On 26 
November 2004, Rath ran a full-page advertisement in the Mail & Guardian titled “Why 
should South Africans continue to be poisoned by AZT?” (Geffen, 2010: 136). According 
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to Geffen (2010: 136), this advert marked a “turning point in the Rath campaign in South 
Africa”, as Geffen and some of his TAC colleagues began organising a “multi-pronged 
response” that led to support from the South African Medical Association (SAMA), as 
well as a complaint being lodged at the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa 
(ASASA). 
 
The Harvard researchers strongly condemned Rath’s misinterpretation of their results and 
stressed that “multivitamin supplements should not be considered as an alternative to 
Haart, but as a complementary intervention that is part of a comprehensive care package” 
(Harvard School of Public Health, 2005). According to Geffen (2010: 126, 129), although 
Rath had a “sequence of court cases, complaints and official findings against him ... on at 
least four continents”, officials of the South African government proceeded to work 
closely with him.  
 
Rath formed alliances with the South African National Civics Organisation (SANCO), 
which was also responsible for running Rath’s programmes in townships, the Traditional 
Healers Organisation (THO), and the National Association of People Living with AIDS 
(Napwa) (Geffen, 2006: 3). In time, Napwa became Rath’s ally “to undermine the TAC’s 
work and the rollout of Haart”, which was suggested to Rath by Anthony Mbewu, head 
of the Medical Research Council (MRC), during a meeting in March 2004. According to 
Geffen (2010: 129), Rath also employed several outspoken AIDS denialists, such as the 
American David Rasnick, who was identified as a researcher, and Anthony Brink, a 
South African lawyer, as well as Professor Sam Mhlongo of the Medical University of 
South Africa (Geffen, 2006: 8). 
 
Rath ran an experiment in Khayelitsha, giving his branded vitamins to people with HIV 
(London, 2005, as cited by Geffen, 2006:8). The experiment contained no control group, 
received no ethical committee approval and breached numerous ethical norms. Rath 
published the results of the trial internationally, claiming that micronutrients reverse the 
course of AIDS without the need for ARVs, in newspaper advertisements in The 
Mercury, The New York Times, The International Herald Tribune and The Namibian 
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(Geffen, 2006: 8). He also took a group of people from Khayelitsha and Guguletu with 
him when he presented his results to the media (Nattrass, 2007: 152). One of the people 
told journalists that they were promised “drugs for HIV, groceries, money and homes” if 
they accompanied him to the meeting (Nattrass, 2007: 152). 
 
ASASA ruled in 2005 that Rath could no longer advertise unless he submitted his 
advertisements to ACA’s Advisory Service for approval (van Noort, 2005). The British 
Advertising Standards Authority also ruled against his advertisements, and the US Food 
and Drug Administration issued a caution against him for misleading advertising on the 
internet (Advertising Standards Authority, 2000; Treatment Action Campaign, 2008). 
 
But still he received support from then Health Minister Tshabalala-Msimang. According 
to Nattrass (2008: 169), Rath had support from the Health Minister to conduct the above-
mentioned Khayelitsha trial. This trial was led by Sam Mhlongo, a close friend of Mbeki 
(Cullinan, 2005) and a member of Mbeki’s Presidential AIDS Panel (Nattrass, 2008: 
169). After Rath published the results, Tshabalala-Msimang invited the Rath researchers 
to present their findings to the provincial ministers of health (Official nod for voodoo 
trials? 2005). When criticised, Tshabalala-Msimang claimed the Rath Health Foundation 
was supporting the government’s position on AIDS by providing vitamins and 
micronutrients and told reporters she would only distance herself from Rath “if it can be 
demonstrated that the vitamin supplements that he is prescribing are poisonous for people 
infected with HIV” (Official nod for voodoo trials?, 2005). 
 
It was also not the first time that Rath had tried to convince patients to go off their 
medicine and rather use his vitamins. In Germany, Rath convinced the parents of a boy 
with bone marrow cancer to reject conventional treatment and rather take his vitamins 
(Nattrass, 2007: 151). Rath started treatment of the nine-year-old boy in January 2004, 
and he died in November 2004 (Geffen, 2010: 128). 
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4.3 Conclusion 
The Mbeki government’s policies on HIV affected and directly interfered with the 
functions of the South African Medicines Control Council (MCC). According to Nattrass 
(2007: 162), the “Health Minister (Dlamini-Zuma) appears to have succeeded in de-
clawing the MCC. Whereas during the Virodene saga, Mbeki and the Health Minister 
respected the authority of the MCC to rule that the Vissers were not allowed to conduct 
trials ...”. 
 
However, when the MCC refused the trials there were consequences: “The episode had 
considerable fallout, with the head of the Medicines Control Council (MCC) losing his 
job, in part because the council had refused to allow clinical trials of the miracle cure” 
(Sidley, 2000: 1016). On 24 March 1998 Peter Folb was removed as chairman of the 
MCC, a review committee was set up and at the end of April a new chairman – Helen 
Rees – was appointed (Myburgh, 2007a). 
 
According to Nattrass (2007: 162), “the Health Minister sidestepped the MCC” by giving 
Van der Maas access to AIDS patients in hospitals to test her products and, in the case of 
Matthias Rath, she felt that his trials were appropriate and believed that she was only 
obliged to stop him if it could be shown that his vitamins were harmful. Ubhejane was 
also distributed through AIDS clinics in KwaZulu-Natal, without the consent of the 
MCC. 
 
Nattrass (2007: 157) adds: 
 
In recent years the MCC appears to have become unable or unwilling to challenge 
the Health Minister (unlike the Virodene saga in the late 1990s). Indeed, its 
actions (and inaction) since 2004 have supported her discourse of emphasising 
problems relating to ARVs, while failing to investigate adequately complaints 
about unofficial trials conducted by van der Maas and Rath. 
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The above research indicates the government’s courtship of pseudoscience, and this has 
had dire consequences for South Africa and its citizens. Geffen (2006: 2) points out the 
following consequences as a direct result of the “state-sponsored support for 
pseudoscience”: 
• It has sown confusion among South Africans. 
• Unnecessary deaths have taken place. 
• It has kept the public health sector from expanding the rollout of HAART. 
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5 Media reporting on the Mbeki HIV policy 
5.1 Introduction 
AIDS has caused a considerable public debate in South Africa and has probably been 
“the story of the late twentieth century”, as pointed out by Galloway (2001: 1). The 
public debate and media attention were not only because of the high rates of HIV 
infection in South Africa, but also as a result of the South African government’s response 
to the crisis. When a government, and especially a country’s president, “promotes”, 
protects  and is part of the “development” of research on an unconfirmed AIDS “cure”, 
appears to side with a controversial minority scientific viewpoint that ARVs are toxic and 
that HIV does not cause AIDS, and courts pseudoscientists, the media are bound to be 
critical. 
 
According to Mark Schoofs, who won the 2000 Pulitzer Prize for his series on AIDS in 
Africa, good journalism on HIV comprises of the following three elements: the 
perspectives of people living with AIDS, the larger cultural, economic and political 
context that shapes the epidemic, and the science of HIV (Schoofs, 2000). 
 
The South African media coverage of HIV has focused mainly on the conflicts around the 
HIV policy (and thus only one of the important elements), because President Mbeki’s 
framing of the crisis had a “censoring effect” on the media (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007: 1).  
Unfortunately, this led to the media not playing enough of an educative role, even though 
the media’s most powerful role is that of defining the challenge of HIV for the general 
population (Roth & Hogan, 2001 as cited by Stein, 2001: 5). 
 
When it was first diagnosed, HIV did not get a lot of media attention in South Africa. 
Prior to 1994, the few reports on HIV that were indeed published were highly politicised 
(Malan, 2003: 84). According to Gevisser (1995: 7), the South African media referred to 
“a gay plague” when reporting on HIV/AIDS. Among the white-owned media, AIDS was 
seen as a gay, but also a black, disease (Malan, 2003: 84). On 14 September 1990, the 
Daily Dispatch reported that “Aids was not expected to become an epidemic among 
Whites” and that the “pattern of transmission was different among Blacks and it was not 
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known why” (Connelly & Macleod, 2003: 1). On 11 July 1995, this daily newspaper also 
stated, “Blacks are 10 times as likely to be infected as Whites”. On the other hand, the 
black press referred to HIV as a disease that was developed to wipe out black people. The 
Leader, a KwaZulu-Natal newspaper with the Indian community as target market, 
reported on 6 April 1990 that a pamphlet widely distributed in Johannesburg stated that 
South Africa paid Israel R1 billion for the deadly AIDS virus, with the intention of using 
it as “a genocidal weapon against us (Africans)” (Naran, 1990: 1). 
 
However, in the mid-1990s, media reporting on HIV was no longer just a few reports 
now and then. The Virodene and Sarafina II debacles became highly publicised in the 
South African media, although these reports focused on the accountability of government 
officials and the squandering of public money (Bulger, 1996, as cited by Malan, 2003: 
85), “rarely touching scientific matters” (Malan, 2003: 85). 
 
According to Cullinan (2001: 37), the AIDS pandemic has indeed become “highly 
politicised”; those reporters who were critical of Mbeki and his flirtation with 
“dissidents” were labelled anti-government and even racist. For example, Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang, then Health Minister, stated in a press conference at the Durban 
AIDS conference in 2000 that criticism of how Mbeki handled the debate was simply the 
media “bad-mouthing” the black government (Cullinan, 2001: 37). 
 
Jacobs and Johnson (2007: 1) also found the political battles to be the reason for the 
South African media’s “deficient coverage of HIV/AIDS”. Stein (2001: 9) defined the 
HIV policy as a “political hot potato” that was used to gain and lose political mileage. He 
stated that HIV media stories had an overtly political angle that mainly involved 
conspiracy and controversy. Jacobs and Johnson (2007: 2) wanted to explore the reason 
for this and identified that a lack of resources, “AIDS fatigue”, racial tensions in 
newsrooms and the conflict between the South African government and AIDS activists 
were “relevant explanations for the deficient coverage of HIV, but they don’t tell us 
much”. Instead, these authors proposed that the South African media were shaped by the 
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“political battles and blunders that have accompanied the disease’s spread” (Jacobs and 
Johnson, 2007: 2). 
 
According to Jacobs and Johnson (2007: 128) there have been three “actors” framing the 
AIDS epidemic in South Africa: the media, AIDS social movement organisations 
(particularly the Treatment Action Campaign) and the government (particularly President 
Mbeki and his health ministers). 
 
For this reason, the researcher will now follow the media’s critical HIV trail in reporting 
on the responses and counter-responses of these “actors” (the government and especially 
the TAC), and then try to provide possible reasons for some health journalists’ 
political/critical framing of the HIV policy during the Mbeki Presidency. 
 
5.2 Responses and counter-responses – the government and the TAC 
Several earlier studies (Delate, 2003; Stein, 2001) have shown that political conflict 
between government and AIDS activists has dominated HIV media coverage. Jacobs and 
Johnson (2007: 143) state that HIV media coverage was still dominated “not by the 
broader questions of access to health care but by clashes between TAC leaders and the 
ANC, particularly President Mbeki, which makes for good copy and headlines”. Jacobs 
and Johnson also found that the mainstream media were more sympathetic to activist 
groups (especially the TAC) than to the government. 
 
5.2.1 Virodene 
However, prior to 1998, however, the main “actors” framing the AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa were the ANC government and their biggest critics, mostly opposition political 
parties and the media’s critical reporting. Stein (2001: 10) defines this situation as a 
“political football between black and white political groupings”. 
 
At first the media reporting on Virodene was positive. On 27 January 1997, Die Burger’s 
headline read, “Vigs dalk deur nuwe goedkoop middel gestuit – Reuse-deurbraak deur 
SA span” (1997). This report gave the idea that South Africa had achieved what no 
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country had achieved before – made a breakthrough in finding an AIDS cure. This was 
reported after the research team asked the cabinet (during the meeting that Health 
Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma organised) for R3,7 million to continue their 
research. Mbeki said that the government would like to see this research continuing. 
  
The Virodene saga also changed South African media reporting on HIV forever. 
According to Malan (2003: 86), reporting on Virodene demanded “a basic understanding 
of the science of HIV/AIDS”, because without that there was a danger that journalists 
could report on Virodene as a potential cure. This forced journalists to do research on the 
science on HIV and AIDS; however, some initially reported on Virodene as a potential 
cure, as “virtually no reporters” had scientific backgrounds (Malan, 2003: 86). 
 
Later the government was widely criticised when it became known that it was supporting 
a “cure” that was not peer-reviewed or registered by the Medicines Control Council 
(MCC). On 2 July 1997, the daily newspaper Beeld reported that, according to Mike 
Ellis, then DA spokesperson, the publicity around this possible cure created false hope 
and that Dr Zuma had not done her homework properly (Bigalke & Kruger, 1997). When 
Health Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was asked her opinion, she replied 
 
When I was asked by the researchers to organize a meeting with the cabinet, their 
research looked legitimate to me. It is not my responsibility to ask them if they 
complied to rule a, b or c. I concentrated on the advantages the remedy might 
have and not on the quality control of the research. It is a minister’s responsibility 
to save lives and to encourage research that has the power to do this (Bigalke & 
Kruger, 1997). 
 
On 5 September 1997 the MCC rejected Virodene protocols for the third time (Myburgh, 
2007b). However, on 30 October The Star ran an article quoting Zuma as still 
“promoting” Virodene:  
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The people who work with Virodene are adamant they have something they think 
can work, but until it is tested it will be very difficult to know. Recently, they 
have been abroad and they now have a report from one international toxicologist 
who was recommended to them by the MCC, which has disputed (the finding 
about the toxicity) of the drug. The toxicologist said that, everything being equal, 
they could go ahead, but monitor (the effect of the drug), which is normal for 
scientists. That process is still on, but it hinges really on the MCC to give them 
approval for the research to be done (as cited by Myburgh, 2007b). 
 
On 1 November 1997, Mbeki placed a political frame on Virodene when he told Die 
Burger that Afrikaners should work together and not distance themselves, and see how 
they can contribute to a new community (Politieke redaksie, 1997). Mbeki also said that 
the young Afrikaners that he had met were eager to help overcome South Africa’s 
problems. Here he was referring in particular to the Vissers (Virodene researchers), who 
were amongst the “most exciting people” he had ever met, “whatever the problems with 
their research”. 
  
On 6 March 1998 the Mail & Guardian reported critically and pointed to the 
politicisation of HIV in an article titled, “The real Virodene scandal”, saying that the “... 
political mud-slinging that erupted this week between the Democratic Party and the 
African National Congress over the so-called ‘AIDS treatment’ Virodene has served to 
obscure the real issues, and significant dangers, associated with the Virodene project” 
(The real Virodene scandal, 1998). In this report, Health Minister Zuma is criticised for 
never taking a stand against the Virodene researchers’ “irresponsible behaviour”, through 
which she has undermined South Africa’s safety net of medical practice that is supposed 
to protect the country. 
 
It was only years later, in 2007, that all the facts of the “Virodene affair” became known. 
Apparently the Presidency was still “intimately” involved despite the MCC banning the 
“AIDS cure”. In a series of features titled “The Virodene affair”, James Myburgh wrote 
in 2007 that the reason the ANC – under the Presidency of Mbeki – was involved in the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
 
“promotion”, “protection” and “development” of the so-called “African Solution” was 
because the ANC were involved in the financing of the Tanzanian trial of Virodene 
(Myburgh, 2007a). Myburgh also pointed out that it was because of the government’s 
Virodene involvement that they did not provide ARVs. According to Myburgh, the 
government was waiting for the Virodene trials in London and Tanzania to be concluded. 
On 15 September 2007, Forde reported in the Saturday Star that “R40-million flowed 
from the Union Buildings and the Joburg office of an ANC-linked businessman to the 
developers of Virodene” in 2000 and 2001 (Forde, 2007).  
 
The TAC was only formed on 10 December 1998 and therefore its first “response” to the 
“Virodene affair” was after these allegations were published in 2007 – they called for 
“judicial investigation into the Presidency” the very next day (Forde, 2007). Even though 
the government flatly denied these allegations, and it was not clear whether the cash was 
public or private money, Nathan Geffen, policy coordinator of the TAC, stated that it 
proved that someone in the Presidency had acted “unethically” or even “illegally”, and 
this constituted “the exploitation of the suffering of people with AIDS”. 
 
Malan states that critical reporting on the Virodene affair was dismissed by the 
government as being “prejudiced against an indigenous African cure for AIDS” (2006: 
43). According to Malan, Sarafina II – an AIDS Musical on which Health Minister 
Dlamini-Zuma spent R14 million of European Union funding (without authorisation) that 
had originally been allocated for AIDS prevention (Malan, 2006: 42) – and Virodene “set 
the context for reporting on Mbeki’s dissident debate”. In future, the government would 
regard critical reports as “anti-African” and a “vile and vicious campaign against the head 
of state” (Kelly & Parker, 2001, as cited by Malan, 2003: 87).  
 
5.2.2 The fight for ARVs amidst Mbeki’s dissidence 
In October 1998, then Health Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma announced that all 
mother-to-child transmission prevention (MTCTP) projects would be discontinued 
(Nattrass, 2007: 186). The TAC was formed on 10 December 1998, not long after, and 
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according to Geffen they never thought the “South African government would become 
their main adversary” (2010: 48). 
 
The TAC’s first action as “actors” in the HIV controversy was to hold rallies across the 
country on 21 March 1999 to call for MTCTP (Nattrass, 2007: 186). Zuma’s decision to 
discontinue MTCTP made South Africa “the target of international criticism, both in 
academic journals and the popular press” (Lurie et al., 1999, as cited by Malan, 2003: 
66).  
 
In October 1999, Mbeki addressed the National Council of Provinces about the high 
incidence of rape. When the Treatment Action Campaign called for AZT to be made 
available to pregnant women he vetoed the idea and also said the drug was toxic 
according to a “large volume of literature” (Geffen, 2010: 40).  
 
Business Day reported that, because of this belief, Mbeki decided that antiretrovirals 
would not be given to rape survivors or to stop MTCTP, “not because they were too 
expensive, but because there were legal action in South Africa, Britain and the US 
questioning whether AZT was safe” (Smith, 1999b: 10). Mbeki’s “toxic announcement” 
came “amidst already critical media reports after Dlamini-Zuma announced to 
discontinue MTCTP projects” (Malan, 2003: 87). On 31 October 1999, The Sunday 
Independent carried an article titled “Scientists reject Mbeki’s claim on AIDS drug”, 
which referred to the unanimous criticism by AIDS specialists and activists of Mbeki’s 
claim that the drug AZT is toxic (Sulcas & Randall, 1999: 8). Dr Mark Lurie, a senior 
scientist at the Medical Research Council, stated in the article: “Here is a drug that cuts 
the rate of mother-to-child transmission by 50 percent. If the president is telling us that 
this drug doesn’t work, where is his evidence for this statement?” (Sulcas & Randall, 
1999: 8). 
Charlene Smith, a freelance journalist who later became one of Mbeki’s fiercest critics 
and started campaigning for ARVs, was raped at her home on 1 April 1999 (Smith, 
1999a: 4). Smith published an article about her ordeal in the Mail & Guardian on 9 April 
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(1999a: 4). Despite the violent details of her rape, she explained the difficulties she 
encountered to access antiretroviral drugs, including AZT. As it was not possible to get 
any ARVs at Millpark Hospital in Johannesburg, she was sent to the district surgeon’s 
office. Smith (1999a: 4) wrote:  
There is no AZT there – how could I forget, Minister Nkosazana Zuma, a woman 
too, won’t allow government to give AZT to rape victims and pregnant women to 
reduce transmission of the disease to their babies. The rapist bestows a death 
sentence and the state by refusing to give cheap medication that could save many 
women, becomes executioner. I thought the death sentence was outlawed?  
According to Smith (as cited by Malan, 2003: 88), Dlamini-Zuma issued a press 
statement after Smith’s article, accusing Smith of “being paid by pharmaceutical 
companies”.  
5.2.3 ‘AIDS dissidence’ now on South Africa’s agenda 
Trengove-Jones (2000) noted that HIV and AIDS had never received as much media 
coverage as was the case in March 2000. According to him the catalyst that brought 
“discussion around the pandemic to an all-time low” was a speech made by Judge Edwin 
Cameron on 9 March, addressing the Second National Conference of People Living with 
AIDS, in which the judge offered a concise summary of many weaknesses in the 
government’s HIV policies (Trengove-Jones, 2000). Health Minister Tshabalala-
Msimang claimed at the same conference that criticism is the media “bad-mouthing the 
black government”, and Trengove-Jones (2000) commented on her claim in the Mail & 
Guardian: “So unhelpfully desperate has the government become that it has chosen to 
play the racism card.”  
Further criticism from the media was as a result of incidents like the convened AIDS 
panel after the president publically questioned whether HIV causes AIDS, the 13th 
International AIDS Conference in Durban and the Durban Declaration, as will be seen 
below.  
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Kerry Cullinan, journalist for the Health-e News Service, wrote in the Financial Mail that 
AIDS “dissident” views were virtually unknown in South Africa until Mbeki put them on 
the national agenda (Cullinan, 2004) during this year. Malan, who was a journalist for the 
SABC until 2002, agrees: 
For many in the media the science of AIDS was completely unknown and 
unfathomable territory. There was therefore a real danger of giving South 
Africans incorrect information , which could expose the public to the risk of 
contracting a virus that the government told them was harmless (Malan, 2006: 
44). 
In March Mbeki publicly questioned whether or not HIV causes AIDS and, “as a result 
already tense relations between the South African government and frontline AIDS 
doctors, scientists, and activists who accuse the government of shirking its duty to 
combat the raging epidemic, are exacerbated” (Bolognesi, 2006: 25). According to Sidley 
(2000: 1016), “the president had reopened a 20 year old, dead and buried, scientific 
debate through the media” by doing this. Soon after, “the issue was carried further by 
minister of health” who, by means of a television appearance, started a campaign against 
GlaxoWellcome’s drug zidovudine (AZT). Phillip van Niekerk, editor of the newspaper 
Mail & Guardian, later said on a national radio programme that the minister’s attack 
almost suggested that the pharmaceutical companies manufactured the disease to make 
money (Sidley, 2000: 1016).  
As a result of Mbeki’s doubt he convened a Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel, which 
comprised of “dissidents” as well as orthodox scientists, to “shed light on the causes of 
AIDS”  (Jacobs & Johnson, 2007: 7). The Health Minister made this announcement in 
February and the Sunday Times pointed out that “this would not have been so contentious 
a statement had it not followed the October pronouncement by President Thabo Mbeki 
that the drug AZT is toxic” (Taitz, 2000, as cited by Malan, 2003: 91). On 3 April, Mbeki 
sent a letter to world leaders (Kofi Annan, Bill Clinton and Tony Blair) that made world 
headlines and was published in several South African newspapers (Nattrass, 2007: 188). 
The Mail & Guardian referred to the letter as “deeply disturbing” and demonstrative of 
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“a capacity for justifying the most unreasonable of positions by a brew of implausible 
appeals to populist sentiments and prejudices”, and that Mbeki suggested “a racial-based 
perspective not uncoloured by paranoia” (Berger, 2000: 32). Berger states that the 
president claimed in the letter that he only wanted dissidents to have a platform to speak 
from and for people to listen.  
These critical reports were promptly followed up by government. On 28 March 2000, 
Parks Mankahlana, head of communications in the Presidency at the time, denied in an 
op-ed piece in The Citizen that the president had ever said that HIV did not cause AIDS, 
pointed to AZTs unaffordability as the reason that it could not be provided, said Mbeki’s 
critics were “in denial about HIV/AIDS” and accused the media of intolerance to 
different viewpoints and of siding with the drug companies (Mankahlana, 2000a: 9). 
Mankahlana (2000a: 9) wrote: “He (the president) will intensify the fight to end 
discrimination against and exploitation of people with HIV/AIDS, including by medical 
schemes and pharmaceutical giants who are the beneficiaries in the defence of AZT by 
the media.” 
 
Mankahlana also tried to change the critics’ view with a response in the Business Day 
that the president’s address to the National Council of Provinces had “taken the debate on 
HIV and AIDS to the level it deserves”, and that Mbeki was the only president who “has 
put the HIV issue on the national agenda on a daily basis” (Mankahlana, 2000a: 9).  
President Mbeki refused several requests for interviews from local media organisations 
on the HIV and AIDS controversy, but in April 2000 granted an interview to British 
AIDS dissident journalist, Joan Shenton (Malan, 2003: 92). According to Malan, Shenton 
worked for a London-based company, Meditel, which sold the interview to the South 
African subscription-funded television channel M-Net, where it was broadcast on the 
channel’s investigative programme Carte Blanche. This interview, broadcast on 16 April, 
had Mbeki stating that it was disturbing that a certain view (not the orthodox view that 
HIV causes AIDS) had been silenced:  
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I get a sense that we've all been educated into one school of thought. I'm not 
surprised at all to find among the overwhelming majority of scientists, are people 
who would hold one particular view because that’s all they’re exposed to. This 
other point of view, which is quite frightening, this alternative view in a sense has 
been blacked out. It must not be heard, it must not be seen, that’s the demand now 
(Shenton, 2000). 
Despite overwhelming critical reporting, the country’s largest black daily newspaper, the 
Sowetan, had a completely different approach (Malan, 2003: 94). The newspaper formed 
an in-house journalist committee to establish whether Mbeki had indeed said that HIV 
did not cause AIDS.  According to an HIV-positive journalist, who wrote weekly AIDS 
columns for the Sowetan, the president’s speeches “had been deliberately misinterpreted” 
and the government had entered the debate as the “underdog” because of the unforgivable 
mistakes it had made with the Virodene saga and Sarafina II (Mazibuko, personal 
communication, 2002, as cited by Malan, 2003: 94).  
Another daily newspaper that was not overwhelmingly critical, but rather focused on 
dissident views at the time, was The Citizen. The newspaper published its first opinion 
piece by an AIDS dissident in September 1998 (Williams, 2000). Williams, The Citizen’s 
editor, wrote in an editorial in the newspaper on 7 March 2000 that Mbeki was being 
“open-minded” because he was “entertaining the possibility that the (dissident) ideas 
might have merit”.  
Williams (2000) stated further:  
Those who challenge orthodoxy are amenable to the discussion while 
conventional wisdom wants to shut the door. What is the harm in hearing all 
sides? Yes matters of life and death are involved. But this does not mean that 
withholding AZT is worse than dishing it out. Those who genuinely believe AZT 
kills also have a case ... And the temperature will rise before July’s International 
AIDS 2000 conference in Durban. 
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5.2.4 Reporting on the 2000 Durban AIDS conference  
A few days before the 13th International AIDS conference in Durban, sparks started 
flying in the media. On 3 July 2000, the daily newspaper Beeld reported that a few 
scientists from Mbeki’s Presidential AIDS Advisory Panel had also signed the so-called 
Durban Declaration, in which 5 000 international and national researchers declared that 
HIV causes AIDS (Swanepoel, 2000a: 1). In the same article, the Health Minister, Dr 
Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, said that the Declaration was out of order and that no 
scientist in the Department of Health had been asked to sign it. She asked that the 
Declaration not be associated with the upcoming AIDS Conference, on which the South 
African government had already spent R6 million. Parks Mankahlana dismissed the 
Declaration and said the document would find “its comfortable place among the dustbins 
of the office” (Geffen, 2010: 55). On the same day, The Star carried an article in which 
the government said that they hoped the Durban AIDS conference would not become a 
“Mbeki bashing bazaar” (Sapa, 2000: 1). 
On Sunday, 9 July, the day on which the Durban AIDS Conference opened, the Sunday 
Times carried a front page story consisting of letters regarding HIV and AIDS  between 
Thabo Mbeki and then opposition party leader Tony Leon (AIDS – Mbeki versus Leon, 
2000). The correspondence started when Mbeki and Leon exchanged views on AIDS and 
ARVs in Parliament. Thereafter Leon sent a letter to Mbeki restating his views, followed 
by a letter from drug company Glaxo Wellcome offering to significantly reduce the price 
of AZT for the Department of Health. An outraged Mbeki followed with a letter stating 
that South African rape statistics were false, that journalist Charlene Smith was “blinded 
by racist rage” when she claimed rape was endemic to African society, and that Glaxo 
Wellcome’s cut price on AZT was a violation of the law. Smith’s claim about rape was 
published in a Washington Post article on 4 June (Malan, 2003: 97). 
The president’s opening address was a disappointment to many of the world’s scientists 
when he “pointed to poverty” and not the AIDS virus as the cause of the growing AIDS 
epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa (Collins, 2000). Nkosi Johnson, a famous HIV-positive 
boy, addressed the AIDS conference directly after Mbeki’s opening speech and asked the 
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government to make anti-AIDS drugs available for HIV-positive women and their unborn 
babies (Malan, 2003: 100). Malan states that it later emerged that the president walked 
out while Johnson was pleading for the government to change its policy. 
The government’s unwillingness to provide ARVs evoked a very critical response from 
the TAC. Firstly, the TAC led a march of 5 000 people, which was covered by the BBC 
and CNN, to the AIDS conference in Durban (Geffen, 2010: 54, 55). On 14 July, Beeld 
newspaper reported that the TAC had announced the previous day that they were taking 
legal steps against the government if it did not announce a treatment programme for 
pregnant women by the following Friday (Swanepoel, 2000b: 1). According to 
Swanepoel, the government had already received research findings stating that 
Nevirapine could stop the spread of HIV from mother to baby three weeks previously, 
which was why the TAC was calling for immediate action. In response, the Department 
of Health said they were still concerned about the 17% of women who showed resistance 
to Nevirapine in the specific study. Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba, then director general of health, 
commented that they had only received the provisional results of the study and that there 
was no need to go to court because they would meet with the researchers just after the 
conference to discuss the remaining issues. On the same day, Beeld also reported that 
Tshabalala-Msimang had admitted, in response to criticism from a TAC member, that the 
government’s national HIV and AIDS strategy had come too late (Liebenberg, 2001: 2). 
However, she blamed transformation and the fight for freedom as the reasons, and gave 
the previous government the blame for the lack of service delivery because “they could 
not change their mindset”. 
On 15 July The Citizen broke the story “on why the government was dragging its feet in 
giving pregnant women HIV medication” (Parks vs Science: ‘It’s all on tape’, 2000: 1). 
This article came after Mankahlana’s comments appeared in Science, a respected 
American scientific magazine, in an article titled “South Africa’s new enemy” (Cohen, 
2000: 2168-2170). In the Science article, Mankahlana was quoted as saying “... that 
mother is going to die and that HIV negative child will be an orphan. That child must be 
brought up. Who’s going to bring the child up? It’s the state, the state. That’s resources 
you see” (Parks vs Science: ‘It’s all on tape’, 2000: 1). According to the article in The 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
67 
 
Citizen, Mankahlana branded the Science article a “complete fabrication”, but Science 
magazine news editor Colin Norman said Mankahlana’s answers were tape-recorded in 
an interview in his office on March 24 and he would be happy to play it to anyone 
(including Mankahlana) who wanted to hear it. 
5.2.5 Parks Mankahlana’s death  
On October 26, the Presidency announced the death of Mankahlana at the age of 36 and 
all indications were that he had died of HIV (Malan, 2003: 101). The TAC responded to 
the government’s announcement by calling on them “to tell the truth” about 
Mankahlana’s death, and to publicly acknowledge that a number of senior government 
officials were HIV positive (Dempster, 2000). On 27 October the Mail & Guardian 
reported that Mankahlana had died of AIDS, citing an anonymous senior ANC official 
(Journalism Ethics – a Global Debate, 2003). According to the report, Mankahlana’s 
strong AIDS dissident stance had “made the cause of Mankahlana’s death a public 
domain issue” (Journalism Ethics – a Global Debate, 2003: 22).  
Kerry Cullinan, managing editor of Health-e News Service, states that it took the death of 
Mankahlana to “awaken the South African media to the intricacies of reporting on 
HIV/AIDS” (Cullinan, 2001: 35). According to Cullinan (2001) there were mainly two 
views in the media after his death: journalists like The Star’s Lizeka Mda, who appealed 
for other journalists to respect the dead and chastised them for not asking Mankahlana his 
HIV status while alive; and Business Day’s Jim Jones, who emphasised the fact that 
Mankahlana had two child maintenance cases against him and was “promiscuous”.  
The International Centre for Journalists points out that, for many reporters in South 
Africa, the question of stigma and privacy are superseded by the political dimension 
when a public official in President Mbeki’s government dies of AIDS (Journalism Ethics 
– a Global Debate, 2003: 22). On 29 October, journalist Ranjeni Munusamy pointed out 
in The Sunday Times that Mankahlana’s “battle with his illness became mixed up with the 
battle he was fighting on Mbeki’s behalf. And he lost both” (Journalism Ethics – a Global 
Debate, 2003: 22-23). 
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5.2.6 The battle for Nevirapine 
The media coverage of the legal battle between the government and the TAC to provide 
MTCTP to pregnant HIV-positive women clearly supported the TAC and opposed the 
government (Spurr, 2005). According to a study by the Perinatal HIV and Research Unit 
at the University of Witwatersrand Journalism Program (Finlay, 2004), coverage of AIDS 
also skyrocketed during the litigation. 
The TAC had already threatened legal steps regarding treatment for HIV-positive 
pregnant women during the 2000 AIDS Conference in Durban, and it certainly did not 
help the government’s “case” when the Health Minister rejected free Nevirapine. During 
the Conference, Boehringer Ingelheim had offered to provide Nevirapine to government 
MTCTP programmes free of charge for five years, but the Health Minister still argued 
that the drug was not safe (Nattrass, 2007: 188).  Beeld published a report that stated that 
Tshabalala-Msimang had postponed pilot projects in March 2001, and then referred the 
projects to the cabinet in April (Liebenberg, 2001: 4). In this article, TAC member Cati 
Vawda stated that the TAC and the public were “in the dark” about the government’s 
plans with the pilot projects after the Health Minister handed over the decision to the 
government. According to a comment during a press conference by Promise Mthembu, a 
member of the TAC, the government also did not reply to a letter sent by the TAC, 
requesting the details of the pilot projects. 
The government kept dragging its feet on the MTCTP pilot projects and, on 21 August 
2001, the TAC filed a motion in the Pretoria High Court “to compel the Health Minister 
and provincial MECs for Health to make Nevirapine available for MTCTP in the public 
sector” (Nattrass, 2007: 190). The state argued that it already had 18 pilot sites that could 
not be expanded because of a lack of resources and once again questioned the efficacy 
and safety of Nevirapine (Malan, 2003: 80). 
On 22 August the daily newspaper Die Burger reported national TAC coordinator Zackie 
Achmat’s statement that the government had not released the findings of a study that 
found that a programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission would be the cheaper 
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option (Pienaar, 2001: 2). In the same article, John Heath, marketing director of 
Boehringer Ingelheim, stated that they were finding themselves on the sideline while 
activists were taking on the government. Heath commented that he could not explain why 
the government was paying for Nevirapine, while Boehringer Ingelheim offered to 
provide it free of charge for five years. The government commented that, according to 
their knowledge, court pleadings were not submitted and they would get legal advice as 
soon as they had received the legal documents. 
On 14 December 2001 the High Court ruled in favour of the TAC, but the government 
appealed to the Constitutional Court (Nattrass, 2007: 190). On 12 March 2002, Beeld 
carried a report stating the High Court’s decision that Nevirapine must be given to 
pregnant HIV-positive women in public hospitals, even though the government had 
appealed to the Constitutional Court (Pienaar, 2002: 4). Achmat’s response was that 
“morality was placed back into the law process as well as policy making” (Pienaar, 2002: 
4). Sibani Mngadi, spokesperson for Tshabalala-Msimang, said that the government was 
worried about the court’s decision.  
Finlay (2004: 85) pointed out that “Nevirapine was central to most news items dealing 
with HIV/AIDS” because of the TAC’s High Court challenge on the issue. On 5 July 
2002, the Constitutional Court ordered the government to make Nevirapine available to 
state facilities with immediate effect (Nattrass, 2007: 190). The ruling was made during 
the 14th International AIDS Conference in Barcelona. Laurie Garrett, health 
correspondent for Newsday, asked Tshabalala-Msimang’s opinion on the ruling and she 
replied: “The High Court has decided the constitution says I must give my people a drug 
that isn’t approved by the FDA (Food and Drug Administration in the United States). I 
must poison my people” (Garrett, 2002). 
Willemien Brümmer (2004: 2) noted in Die Burger that Tshabalala-Msimang and 
Achmat used every given chance to badmouth each other. This time it was at the 
Bangkok International AIDS Conference, where the Health Minister, when was asked to 
comment on the High Court’s recent decision, said her government “was forced by the 
courts and the TAC to extend their Nevirapine programmes that was initially only for 
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research purposes” (Brümmer, 2004: 2). During a protest just outside the conference 
centre, Achmat commented that the minister was a danger to public health because she 
did “not understand science, Nevirapine or AIDS statistics”. 
5.2.7 Tshabalala-Msimang’s ‘grand reopening’ of AIDS controversy – 
criticism follows 
In 2002 the Health Minister started using AIDS denialist Roberto Giraldo as adviser 
(Nattrass, 2007: 191). In a cartoon in the Sowetan on 23 January 2003, cartoonist Zapiro 
labelled her relationship with Giraldo as “Manto’s AIDS controversy grand reopening”  
(Nattrass, 2007: 107). The Health Minister’s relationship with Giraldo provoked a lot of 
criticism from the TAC, and was the start of public battles in the media between the TAC 
and the Health Minister. On 20 January 2003 Business Day reported that “AIDS activists 
voiced sharp criticism” because Tshabalala-Msimang had invited Roberto Giraldo, “who 
believes that AIDS is caused by nutritional deficiencies and not HIV”, to address a top-
level meeting of regional health ministers (Kahn, 2003).  Geffen from the TAC 
commented: “During every epidemic there are people who resort to superstition and 
pseudoscience. What’s disturbing is that Tshabalala-Msimang is giving official sanction 
to pseudoscience and superstition, which is unacceptable” (Kahn, 2003).  .  
Health department spokesman Sibani Mngadi stated that Giraldo was only invited 
because of his expertise as nutritionist, since the purpose of the meeting was to look 
specifically at nutrition and its role in improving the condition of people living with 
HIV/AIDS. Directly after the meeting, the TAC announced a civil disobedience plan and 
lashed out at Tshabalala-Msimang. Achmat said to Business Day: “Instead of working to 
develop a national prevention and treatment plan, she is making it clear she supports HIV 
denialism, and is therefore making civil disobedience unavoidable” (Kahn, 2003: 3). 
In April 2003 Tshabalala-Msimang played the race card against the TAC at the welcome 
meeting for Richard Feachem, executive director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria. Beeld reported that the minister said a “white man” 
(Heywood) was behind the campaign of civil disobedience against her and the 
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government (Pienaar, 2003: 5). She went further to call TAC activists a group of black 
“actors”.  A TAC member responded by saying that “Manto” was the actor, and that they 
were fighting for ARVs while having to watch loved ones die in front of their eyes. The 
Health Minister’s spokesman, Sibani Mngadi, stated that people who were under 
apartheid were not supposed to undermine the political authority of the government that 
they had fought for. Nattrass (2007: 116) noted that Heywood, who was in the audience, 
heckled the Health Minister “just like she was heckled all year by TAC supporters 
whenever she made public speeches”. 
Another such a moment was during the South African AIDS Conference in August 2003. 
Independent Online reported that, while Tshabalala-Msimang gave a speech carefully 
avoiding the “current Nevirapine crisis”, “details on the long-awaited national AIDS 
treatment plan”, or “the R720-million Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria money for KwaZulu Natal”, TAC members shouted “AIDS treatment now” and 
“Shame on you” (Clarke, 2003; Nattrass, 2007: 116). 
After much delay the government finally released their “operational plan for Haart rollout 
in November 2003” (Nattrass, 2007: 120). But, on 24 February 2004, the Cape Times 
stated that the National Department of Health was “lagging far behind the timelines that 
were set for providing anti-retrovirals” (Smetherham, 2004: 7). Geffen commented that 
all it would take was spending money that was available and that the delay was “causing 
confusion, loss of dignity, suffering and death”, and he again threatened with litigation. 
The TAC took it a step further, publishing their ARV rollout status report in the Mail & 
Guardian on 12 July 2004 under the headline “Slow road to drugs rollout” (Hassan, 
2004). Hassan wrote: “The minister herself has refused to make information available on 
patient targets and timelines for the implementation of the plan despite informal and 
formal requests”. Directly below the TAC report was a reply from the Health Minister 
entitled, “Tackling the Treatment Action Campaign report” (Tshabalala-Msimang, 2004: 
34). Finlay (2004: 79) pointed out that “neither of the two pieces was interrogated by the 
newspaper”. 
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In November 2004 the TAC and Tshabalala-Msimang once again “locked horns” in 
another court case. The Star revealed that the TAC was taking the Department of Health 
to court because it had led the public to believe that it had compiled a timetable for the 
rollout of ARVs, according to TAC deputy chairperson Sipho Mthathi (Sapa, 2004: 5). 
On 15 December it was reported in Beeld that “Manto” had lost the court case against the 
TAC and had to pay the legal costs incurred by TAC in its efforts to see a timetable that 
never existed (Pienaar & De Villiers, 2004: 5). 
In 2005 Matthias Rath started advertising his multivitamins in South Africa and, despite 
various court cases, complaints and official findings against him, Tshabalala-Msimang 
still supported him (Geffen, 2010; Nattrass, 2007). The media once again had a field day, 
especially because of infuriated responses from the TAC. On 30 November 2005 The 
Citizen reported that, according to the TAC, the Health Minister had failed to protect the 
public from Rath’s dangerous claims that his vitamins could cure HIV and that, as a 
result, they were taking legal action against the minister (Graham, 2005). In the article 
the TAC stated: “The scientifically bogus messages of Rath engulfing South African 
society about HIV, are leading to confusion and numerous avoidable deaths” (Graham, 
2005: 10). About a month later the Mail & Guardian stated that Rath was doing an 
illegal, clinical pilot study in Khayelitsha, but that the “ANC has been strangely silent” 
about it (Official nod for voodoo trials? 2005). According to the report, the Health 
Minister’s only response to the situation was in a written reply to a parliamentary 
question by the Democratic Alliance that she would only distance herself from Rath if it 
could be proven that his vitamin supplements were poisonous to people infected with 
HIV.  
In 2005,  Drum magazine published an article stating that, “like Health Minister Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang, Nozipho Bhengu, daughter of ANC MP Ruth Bhengu, believed 
there was a direct link between nutrition and AIDS”, and that Bhengu was taking an HIV 
potion, prescribed by Dutch nurse Tine van der Maas, and supported by Tshabalala-
Msimang (Geffen, 2010: 103, 104).  
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On 19 May 2006, Bhengu died of AIDS at the age of 32 (Geffen, 2010: 104). On 24 May 
the TAC issued a statement stating “Nozipho Bhengu’s death shows the urgent need for 
science, truth, leadership and personal responsibility to lead the HIV and AIDS response” 
(Geffen, 2010: 104). In the statement the TAC also said that they held Tine van der Maas 
partially responsible for Nizopho’s death and they called on Tshabalala-Msimang to have 
Tine van der Maas and other quacks arrested.  
According to Geffen (2010: 104), this “set off a furore” with the government because it 
was “culturally taboo in South Africa to talk in a controversial way about the dead”. 
According to Geffen (2010: 4) a number of journalists told him that they thought the 
TAC’s statement was callous.  But the Mail & Guardian supported the TAC by writing: 
“The Mail & Guardian respects and sympathises with the family’s grief over the AIDS 
related death last week of Nozipho Bhengu ... But there is inescapable truth in (TAC’s) 
charge that the tragedy can be laid at the doorstep of Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang and her AIDS muse, the dangerous Dutch crank Tine Van der Maas” 
(Dangerous quackery, 2006: 22). 
Critical media coverage of Tshabalala-Msimang, generated mostly by the TAC, reached 
an all-time high during the 2006 Toronto international AIDS conference. Nattrass (2007: 
174) pointed out that the TAC “was very successful at mobilising international support 
and coordinating it with domestic protest”, which was exactly what the TAC did during 
the 2006 conference.  
On the international front the Mail & Guardian reported on 17 August 2006 that “TAC 
members protested at the South African stand at the conference” where the Health 
Minister was promoting garlic, lemon and beetroot (Blandy, 2006). Blandy wrote: 
“Geffen clashed with exhibition organisers when he tried to remove garlic from the 
stand”.  
Two days later Beeld reported that 43 TAC members, as well as TAC leader Zackie 
Achmat, had been arrested because of an unlawful protest in front of the Cape Town 
provincial health offices while chanting the words “Arrest Manto” (O’Connor, 2006: 4). 
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According to the report, Achmat commented that the TAC would do everything in its 
power to see that the Health Minister lost her job.  
On the closing day of the conference, UN special envoy on AIDS in Africa, Stephen 
Lewis, criticised Tshabalala-Msimang’s pseudoscience and South Africa’s poor 
performance on the rollout of antiretrovirals, reported Die Burger (O’Connor, 2006: 2). 
Die Burger also reported that Achmat’s response to Lewis’s lambasting speech was that 
Mbeki must now explain why he was keeping Tshabalala-Msimang on as minister of 
health. Nattrass (2007: 177) pointed out that this embarrassment for the South African 
government was facilitated by sympathy towards the media. Anton Harber (2006: 15), 
co-founding editor of the Mail & Guardian, wrote: 
Those newspapers that bravely spoke out in the last few years against government 
policy and inactivity on HIV – and withstood the pressure to fall into line on this 
matter – deserve a pat on the back ... TAC would not have had much impact 
without the extensive media coverage they have received; and the international 
attitude to our country’s policies would be unknown without those who brought it 
to our attention in these newspapers. A special mention belongs to those reporters 
and their editors who told us what they saw at the South African stand at the 
recent Toronto AIDS conference – apparently a turning point in our government’s 
attitude on the issue. 
5.2.8 The criticism of Mbeki continues 
In 2003, Mbeki’s State of the Nation Address on 14 February started evoking critical 
media coverage because of what he said (or did not say) about HIV and AIDS, as he 
mentioned AIDS only in passing. On 15 February Die Burger reported that, while 10 000 
people were protesting in a TAC march for AIDS treatment outside Parliament, the 
president only mentioned AIDS once after he mentioned that tuberculosis was the biggest 
killer in South Africa (Mbeki sê min oor vigs, Zim, 2003: 1). The Daily Dispatch took it 
a step further in an editorial piece: “President Mbeki’s brush-off of the killer disease that 
will claim hundreds of thousands of lives this year has wounded activists, pleading for an 
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urgent national treatment plan and an HIV and AIDS charter. And puzzled everyone” 
(Baragwanath vs Baghdad, 2003: 9). The Daily Dispatch further referred to his brief 
mentioning of HIV as “brief, general comments” that would “reinforce perceptions that 
he refuses to see the writing on the wall and is unwilling, or lacks the courage, to tackle 
the crisis head-on” (Baragwanath vs Baghdad, 2003: 9). 
After Mbeki’s 2004 Address, Business Day carried a report titled “Mbeki skirted top 
three issues”, referring to the fact that he did not mention the three biggest threats, 
namely HIV/AIDS, crime and the crisis in Zimbabwe (Hartley, 2004: 9). According to 
the article, HIV/AIDS was mentioned once and there was no mention of the rollout of 
antiretroviral drugs. 
In 2005 the president’s State of the Nation Address once again evoked critical media 
coverage. The Sunday Argus reported in February 2005 that Statistics South Africa’s 
Mortality and Causes of Death in South Africa report showed that the adult death rate had 
soared by 62% from 1997 to 2002 (Hooper-Box, 2005: 2). In the same article, 
statistician-general Pali Lehohla explained that the data “provided indirect evidence that 
the HIV epidemic in SA is raising the mortality levels of prime-aged adults, and 
associated diseases are on the increase” (Hooper-Box, 2005: 2). The TAC commented 
that the death toll could be combated with the MTCTP programmes and the rollout of 
antiretroviral medicines. News24 reported that Mbeki mentioned South Africa’s 
“comprehensive” AIDS programmes and the “greater vigour” with which the government 
was fighting AIDS, without acknowledging that ARV treatment targets had not been met 
(SA ‘stepping up’ AIDS fight, 2005). The TAC responded by pointing out that only about 
20 000 people were receiving ARVs, when the president said in his previous State of the 
Nation Speech that 53 000 people would be receiving ARVs from state-accredited health 
centres by March 2005. 
In 2006 scientists across the world demanded answers from Mbeki for his Health 
Minister’s blunders. On 6 September 2006 Beeld carried an article about the letter to 
Mbeki from 60 scientists across the world in the field of HIV and AIDS, in which they 
demanded that he fire Tshabalala-Msimang immediately (Louw, 2006: 3). According to 
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Nattrass (2007: 178), Geffen of the TAC helped to draft the letter and to mobilise 
signatories.  
The Health Minister was not fired, nor did she resign. The Sunday Times published an 
open letter to President Mbeki from the TAC on 30 September 2007, noting the details of 
two letters being sent to the President before getting a reply a year after the first letter had 
been sent (Dear Mr President, 2007: 21). In the TAC’s first letter they explained in great 
detail “the areas in which the minister of health has failed in her constitutional duties”. 
The TAC sent another letter to the President’s office on 24 August 2007, requesting 
reasons for retaining Tshabalala-Msimang after the President’s office publically 
requested “evidence of her failure to do her duty”. The letter stated further the TAC’s 
deep regret about the office’s reply, which was: “there is no constitutional obligation on 
the part of the President to furnish reasons” for the “continued retention of Dr Manto 
Tshabalala-Msimang in office as Minister of Health” (Dear Mr President, 2007: 21).   
5.2.9 The ‘Madlala-Routledge factor’ 
In October 2006 Tshabalala-Msimang was on sick leave because of liver and lung 
problems, and this provided “(Nozizwe) Madlala-Routledge (Deputy Minister of Health) 
with the opportunity to change the Health Ministry’s discourse on AIDS” (Nattrass, 
2007: 172). The “Madlala-Routledge factor”, as Nattrass put it, resulted in critical media 
coverage, domestically as well as internationally, for Mbeki and his Health Minister. 
In December 2006 The Telegraph in London reported in an article titled “African 
minister ends decade of denial on AIDS” that Madlala-Routledge had publically admitted 
for the very first time that the South African government had been “in denial at the very 
highest level” over AIDS (Bevan, 2006). According to The Telegraph, Madlala-
Routledge had also criticised those who had promoted traditional medicines as an 
alternative drug treatment in an interview with The Sunday Telegraph and made it clear 
that her criticism included Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang. The Health Minister hit back 
from her hospital bed with a letter on the ANC website, stating that her illness had been 
seen as an opportunity to turn others into champions of a campaign to rid the government 
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of so-called “HIV and AIDS denial at the highest level” (Manto rejects deputy’s damning 
report, 2007).  
In July 2007, Tshabalala-Msimang rejected Madlala-Routledge’s report on infant deaths 
at the Frere Hospital in East London, and it was reported in the City Press on 27 July that 
the TAC had called for the minister to be sacked and replaced by her deputy (Manto 
rejects deputy’s damning report, 2007). On the same day, Mbeki posted a letter on the 
ANC website in which he implied that Madlala-Routledge and others “were all colluding 
in falsifying neonatal fatality statistics and lying” about the conditions at Frere Hospital 
(Robins, 2007: 9). The Cape Times referred to this as the “latest phase in the stats wars”, 
and said it seemed like a re-run of the president’s earlier clashes over AIDS, crime and 
rape statistics (Robins, 2007: 9).    
On the eve of Women’s Day the Deputy Minister of Health was fired by Mbeki with 
immediate effect because of her inability to work as part of a collective and for 
undertaking a trip to an AIDS conference in Spain without Mbeki’s consent (Madlala-
Routledge forced to pay for Spain trip, 2007). The TAC was outraged and Heywood 
responded in the Mail & Guardian, saying “we think Mbeki does not tolerate it when 
Cabinet Ministers speak out publicly about government inefficiency” (Madlala-Routledge 
was set up, 2007). On 27 August 2007 the Mail & Guardian reported that the TAC had 
launched a fund to provide “short-term financial assistance” to the fired Deputy Minister 
of Health and wrote a letter to Mbeki asking him to reinstate her and fire Tshabalala-
Msimang (TAC starts support fund for Madlala-Routledge, 2007).  
Madlala-Routledge’s dismissal also generated criticism internationally. On 10 August 
The Independent in London carried an article titled “A president in denial, a ravaged 
nation denied hope”, pointing out that “Thabo Mbeki’s stance on AIDS has left South 
Africa with the world’s worst HIV epidemic. Yesterday, he silenced the woman fighting 
to end the suffering of millions” (referring to Mbeki firing Madlala-Routledge) (Pahad, 
2007: 9). The government’s reaction to this negative publicity came in the form of Essop 
Pahad, Minister in the Presidency, writing an article which was published in the Cape 
Times a few days later (Pahad, 2007: 9). Pahad called the Independent article an attempt 
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to use a “domestic event to rubbish the stance of the Mbeki government on HIV and 
AIDS”, saying it was “far-fetched” and “ridiculous”. 
5.2.10 ‘Second-generation denialism’ 
On 21 August 2007 the controversy surrounding Health-Minister Tshabalala-Msimang 
led to Business Day carrying an article titled “Spin, facts and untruths in the new season 
of denialism” (Trengove-Jones, 2007: 11).  According to the article Mbeki had defended 
his Health Minister in his online newsletter for two successive weeks, attacking the media 
and insisting that the media apply their minds to “facts”. According to Trengove-Jones 
(2007: 11), “attacks on the media are standard in contemporary government discourse 
and embody a tendency to beat the messenger bringing bad news”. Later in the article the 
President was accused of “second-generation denialism” because he was denying a 
history of denialism that had taken place over the previous few years. The article also 
stated that evidence of denialism was found in the fact that the rollout of MTCTP, as well 
as ARV, was embarked upon only when the TAC took the government to court. 
5.2.11 Mbeki’s resignation – the end of AIDS denialism? 
Nattrass (2007: 184) wrote at the end of her book, Mortal combat: AIDS denialism and 
the struggle for antiretrovirals in South Africa, that “only when science is firmly re-
established as the benchmark for AIDS treatment will its ghost finally be exorcised”.  
On 21 September 2008, President Mbeki handed in his letter of resignation (Mbeki 
resigns before the nation, 2008). Mbeki’s resignation led to Tshabalala-Msimang’s move 
to the president’s office, “thus ending her rule as one of the most controversial and 
destructive cabinet ministers” (Cullinan, 2008). 
The media and the TAC responded very positively towards a new Health Minister. On 25 
September 2008 an article titled “New Health Minister means end of government AIDS 
denialism” was published on health-e (Cullinan, 2008). According to the article the 
appointment of Barbara Hogan as Minister of Health and Dr Molefi Sefularo as Deputy 
Minister of Health marked the end of “the period of politically supported AIDS 
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denialism”. The TAC’s Zackie Achmat commented: “We are confident that Hogan has 
the ability to improve the South African health system. She has been one of the few 
Members of Parliament to speak out against AIDS denialism and to offer support to the 
TAC, even during the worst period of AIDS denialism by former President Thabo Mbeki 
and former Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang” (Cullinan, 2008). 
On 13 October 2008 the Mail & Guardian reported positively when Hogan appealed to 
scientists to intensify efforts to find an AIDS vaccine: “Her speech on Monday marked a 
radical break in policy from her predecessor, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang” (Intensify 
fight against AIDS, says Health Minister, 2008). 
On 17 October 2008 the Mail & Guardian expressed its relief about a new Minister of 
Health in an op-ed piece titled “At last, an end to the lemons”: “In a month our health 
regime has moved from folly and despair to hope and commitment” (At last, an end to 
the lemons, 2008). However, the newspaper still did not trust government completely 
after the “regime” of Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, which “existed in a bunker of 
opprobrium and arrogance, its officials serving a deathly ideology of denial, listening 
only to a president who sacrificed his people on the altar of loony science” (At last, an 
end to the lemons, 2008). The article stated: “We hope Hogan makes the Cabinet cut after 
next year’s election. The health system deserves such a servant.” 
The Sunday newspaper Rapport referred to the new Minister of Health as a “small 
politician” who was not scared of the problems that would be facing her in the 
department of health on 21 October 2008 (Hogan wil siek SA stelsel gesond kry: Reuse-
taak lê voor vir klein vroutjie in groot ministerstoel, 2008). 
5.3 Conclusion on media reporting 
Robins (2007: 9) points out that, because they supported AIDS dissidents and questioned 
AIDS statistics, the viral aetiology and the safety and efficacy of anti-retroviral treatment, 
Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang were “portrayed in the media as misguided, irrational 
and irresponsible”. The opposite holds for the media’s view of those holding an orthodox 
AIDS position: “... the mainstream scientific establishment, which is shared by most 
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medical professionals, activists, academics and journalists, is usually presented as 
rational, scientific and self-evident” (Robins, 2007: 9). 
This fact, that media reporting mostly was positive towards AIDS activists like the TAC 
and negative or critical towards Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang, was also evident in the 
content analysis of media reporting on HIV during the Presidency of Mbeki. 
Some believe that the coverage of conflict around the HIV policy resulted in the absence 
of the broad analytical role that is supposed to be played by the media, and that the media 
failed “as a proactive, informed interlocutor in the conflict” (Finlay, 2004: 70). 
Jacobs and Johnson (2007: 119) concluded in their study: 
We argue that while it was inevitable, that key leadership within the South 
African government’s controversial stances on HIV and AIDS was bound to 
dominate media coverage the media not only trivialized coverage of the epidemic 
or encouraged sensational or factual incorrect reporting, but, more importantly, 
obscured and prevented public debate of the HIV/AIDS epidemic beyond a 
sensational, misguided conflict-driven ‘debate’ between government and social 
movements over the causes of HIV/AIDS. 
Geffen (2010: 189) explains that the effort made by the TAC with the media resulted in 
the media’s critical stance towards government and positive attitude towards the TAC: 
We had a well-run national campaign that made effective use of the media and the 
courts ... We also put a lot of effort into our relationship with the media, 
organising hundreds of interviews between journalists and TAC members. We 
gave workshops explaining HIV science to reporters. We would spend hours 
explaining our court cases and actions, such as our highly controversial civil 
disobedience campaign. This reaped rewards. Most journalists were highly critical 
of Mbeki and very favourable to the TAC. 
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According to Malan (2003: 110), dissident responses from government led to counter-
responses from the TAC, “ensuring orthodox viewpoints received consistent coverage”. 
This may imply that the public was constantly scientifically educated about HIV, which 
would not have been the case if the conflict had not existed between the two parties. 
The resignation of President Mbeki, which also led to the re-assignment of Health 
Minister Tshabalala-Msimang, meant a new Minister of Health for South Africa and 
marked a change in media coverage of HIV/AIDS. The media reported more positively 
about the HIV policy because it meant “the end of government AIDS denialism” 
(Cullinan, 2008). 
5.4 Journalists’ side of the story 
The researcher sent out questionnaires to seven journalists who reported on health during 
the time of Mbeki’s Presidency (1999 to 2008). Four journalists completed the 
questionnaire. 
The objective of the questionnaire was to explore possible reasons for the media’s 
attitude to HIV communication by the government during that time, and why journalists 
mostly reported critically on the government’s HIV policy. 
5.4.1 Limitations 
This study only captures the understandings and responses of some health journalists. 
Some of the respondents were health reporters only during a certain period of Mbeki’s 
Presidency. There is no doubt that other opinions and understandings exist that warrant 
further study. 
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5.4.2 Discussion of the results from the questionnaires completed by 
health journalists 
These results provide reasons for the conclusion drawn from the content analysis of 
media reporting, namely that health journalists during Mbeki’s Presidency mostly 
reported critically on the government, and that the mainstream media were more 
sympathetic towards activist groups (especially the TAC) than towards government. 
 The four journalists who completed the questionnaire were Journalist A (JA), a journalist 
for the SABC from 1999 to 2002; Journalist B (JB), a health journalist for Die Burger 
from 2001 to 2004; Journalist C (JC), a freelance journalist for various publications on 
health issues during Mbeki’s Presidency; and Journalist D (JD), a health journalist for 
Beeld since 2001. 
The main reasons for the journalists’ critical reporting on the government’s HIV policy 
are discussed within the context of various categories which emerged from their 
completed questionnaires. 
A The government’s communication on HIV from 1999 to 2008 
All the respondents felt that the communication from government on HIV was poor:  
“It was always a struggle to get hold of the Health Minister” (JA).  
“As far as I remember Manto Tshabalala-Msimang’s spokesperson was Sibani 
Mngadi, and there was an internal joke among health journalists that he almost 
never calls back. However, the Western Cape’s Department of Health was in the 
capable hands of Dr Fareed Abdullah, who was Deputy Director General of health 
in this department. Abdullah regularly held press conferences, communicated 
with journalists and I could make an appointment with him at any time and walk 
into his office” (JB). 
“Poor, denialist and defensive most of the time” (JD). 
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There was a stronger opinion that there was absolutely no communication: 
“What communications? It was led by the President and Health Minister’s 
insulting position on AIDS and by that I mean the ways they insulted those ill 
with the virus, journalists and NGO’s under Mbeki. It improved once Zuma came 
in and Aaron Motsoaledi took over, his approach was completely different, but 
communications from the health department have always been sub-par, they have 
tended to employ PRs who are lax about getting back to journalists, rarely pro-
active, and not cognisant of the fact that they were there to serve the people of SA 
and not just ministerial bosses” (JC). 
 
B Better relationship with AIDS activists than government 
According to some of the respondents it was clear that the journalists had better 
relationships with AIDS activists (especially the TAC) than with government, for various 
reasons: 
“A murky area is that I think journalists who reported on HIV had much closer 
relationships with HIV activists than they would have had had Mbeki and Manto 
not advocated against science. I don’t think it necessarily interfered with my 
reporting, but I think “advocated reporting” (for science) was quite accepted by 
journalists at the time, as it happened amongst extraordinary circumstances” (JA). 
“A lot of what happened in the National Department of Health was communicated 
to us by the TAC, with which I and a lot of other journalists had regular contact” 
(JB). 
“The TAC focused on the science and human rights, not on getting the votes, 
political positioning and snake oil like the Department of Health did” (JD). 
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C Pressure from government 
Some of the respondents felt pressure from the government not to be critical towards the 
President and his Health Minister: 
“I didn’t feel pressure until Snuki Zikalala became the head of news. I once 
reported on Mbeki (yet again) not turning up at a World AIDS Day event, and got 
comments from HIV activists on it. After having done a radio report on it, I 
started filing for the TV evening news bulletin. I think someone from government 
must have phoned Snuki, because he came into the editing studio along with a 
manager, refused for the bulletin editor, who had cleared the story, to enter the 
studio, and forced me to remove the comments from the activists, stating: it’s 
unfair to criticise the president while he’s not in the country. At the Durban 2000 
international HIV conference I had to closely liaise with one of my editors to 
ensure my (critical) reports were broadcast. We basically had to bypass Snuki. 
Other than that, I can’t recall not getting stuff broadcast. I did critical after critical 
report about both Manto and Mbeki” (JA). 
“A number of editors stopped using my writing because Mbeki or Frank Chikane 
would call them and lambast them for using my work. Nazeem Howa was one of 
them. He was general manager at Independent Newspapers; he placed a ban on 
the use of my stories if they were about rape or HIV, as one example. Many 
editors were apologetic, yet others simply stopped using me.  Sunday Independent 
continued trying to use me but it was challenging for them because of Mbeki's 
attacks. Former Anglican Archbishop Njabulo Ndungane, as one example, called 
me once and told how Chikane asked if I had indeed interviewed him for a piece 
in You magazine in which I quoted Ndungane as saying Mbeki was 'over-
sensitive' when it came to HIV, something like that. Ndungane said I had quoted 
him correctly, Chikane asked him to issue a press statement saying I was lying. 
Ndungane refused to do it, and informed me. The same call was made to William 
Makgoba by Mbeki about the same article, he too confirmed I had quoted him 
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accurately, he too refused to issue a statement against me, and he too called and 
informed me” (JC). 
 
“The journalists were often insulted by Dr Manto Tshabalala-Msimang if they 
asked critical questions” (JD). 
 
D How the government influenced journalists’ reporting 
There is an opinion that Mbeki and his Health Minister’s dissident views had a positive 
effect on journalists’ reporting: 
“The positive side of their comments was that journalists were forced to become 
scientifically literate about HIV – otherwise they wouldn’t understand the debate. 
Activist organisations such as the TAC and the AIDS Law Project (now Section 
27) were excellent at using almost every incorrect statement by the president or 
Health Minister as an opportunity to educate journalists, and, in effect the media” 
(JA). 
Others, however, feel differently: 
“When looking back, we journalists maybe did not put enough effort into it to tell 
both sides of the story – mostly because it was so difficult to reach the National 
Department of Health and others made it so easy for the media. That said, the 
National Department of Health was openly antagonistic towards the media, 
although it may have been our own fault” (JB). 
5.4.3 Conclusion on results from questionnaires 
Finlay (2004: 88) argues that, while Tshabalala-Msimang and Mbeki have been critical of 
the media, “the compliment has been returned”. Finlay (2004: 88) states: 
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One needs only to consider the satirical use of the Health Minister’s first name 
(‘Manto’) in news headlines to see the extent to which the antagonism precedes 
any contextual assessment of content. Although ‘Manto’ is better for letter count 
in headlines (preferable, that is, to the minister’s long surname), its use serves a 
constant reminder to of her infamous exchange with 702 talk show host in 2000, 
where she objected to being addressed by her first name ... The exchange served 
to entrench the caricature of a Health Minister inaccessible and aloof to the needs 
of the common people. 
The results of the content analysis of media reports verifies that journalists were mostly 
critical or negative towards government and positive towards the TAC during Mbeki’s 
Presidency. The journalists’ completed questionnaires also seem to verify this. The 
following reasons for this are evident from the results: 
• Communication on HIV/AIDS, especially by the National Department of Health, 
was poor. 
• Journalists had better relationships with AIDS activists, especially the TAC, 
because they went out of their way to communicate with journalists. 
• Journalists were pressured by government not to be critical towards government 
in their HIV reporting, but this made journalists antagonistic towards the 
government. 
• Dissident views by the government caused counter-responses from the TAC, 
which resulted in critical reporting on government. 
• The government was openly antagonistic towards the media, which resulted in 
critical reporting. 
• The HIV policies of the government of Mbeki and his Health Minister were 
blatantly in contrast to scientific evidence and also medically unethical, which is 
why it was the media’s duty to fulfil their watchdog and surveillance of the 
environment role and to be very critical about those policies in the interest of the 
public. 
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APPENDIX 
Questions posed to health journalists regarding HIV reportage 
 
1. How did you find the government’s communication on HIV during 1999-2008? 
2. Were you able to stay objective in your HIV reporting, despite the controversies? 
3. Do you feel that Mbeki’s dissidence indirectly negatively affected the public's 
view on HIV and AIDS? 
4. Do you think journalists were still able to “educate” the public on  HIV and 
AIDS, despite Mbeki and his Health Ministers’ dissident actions? 
5. Did you ever feel pressure from your editor not to be critical towards the 
government when reporting on HIV and the government’s policy? 
6. Did you ever feel pressure from the government not to be critical towards the 
government when reporting on HIV and the government’s policy? 
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